China’s baby trafficking industry reappears: 14 day-old baby boy sold for 150,000 yuan

WRIC Report                               10-21-2024

 

During the strict family planning era, China had a large number of cases of baby trafficking. However, today when the number of births is no longer controlled by the government, China has once again seen a baby trafficking industry chain. A 14-day-old baby boy was traded on the streets of Jiangyin City, Wuxi City, Jiangsu Province, and was sold for 150,000 yuan. The intermediary said that more than ten babies have been sold this year. The police said that the relevant suspects have been controlled and will thoroughly investigate the clues of the crime in other provinces and cities in China.

 

The New York-based NGO China Women’s Rights submitted a report on missing children in China to a hearing committee of the U.S. Congress on anti-child trafficking in 2011 during the most rampant family planning period in China. (The picture is the cover of the anti-trafficking report)

 

 

According to Red Star News, a 14-day-old baby boy was sold for 150,000 yuan on the street in Jiangyin City, Wuxi, Jiangsu Province on the evening of October 19, 2024. Among them, the seller’s driver took a bag of 78,000 yuan in cash, and the rest was the agency fee.

 

The male agent surnamed Su who arranged the transaction said that he has successfully sold more than ten babies this year, and has successfully sold two cases every month recently, “80,000 yuan last month.”

 

The agent said that the baby came from “the big brother who pushed it directly to me.” The “big brother” is the team leader and a relative of the intermediary. He established an intermediary company in Linfen, Shanxi. Six people, including the intermediary, are the company’s “executives” responsible for baby trafficking-related work.

 

After the baby trafficking was exposed, the Jiangyin Public Security Bureau reported on Sunday (20th) that it had controlled the 22-year-old male intermediary surnamed Su. The Wuxi police acted quickly and stopped the tragedy from continuing. The police arrested the Feng couple and others who bought the baby, and the baby has been rescued. But behind the baby trafficking, there is often a mature profit chain. For example, the intermediary Su mentioned that “he has successfully sold more than ten babies” and the source of the babies was “recommended by the big brother.” In other words, there is an organized and divided criminal gang behind it.

 

According to the report, the adoptive parent is an 18-year-old woman surnamed Li who works in Jiangyin; she gave birth to a son on October 6. Because she was unable to raise him, she posted information online through her cousin-in-law surnamed Xue to find an adopter. After seeing the information, the intermediary surnamed Su contacted the Feng couple in other provinces who had adoption needs, and then traded face to face in Jiangyin.

 

The notice also stated that criminal compulsory measures have been taken against the relevant suspects in accordance with the law, and the case is under investigation. The clues of crimes in other provinces and cities will also be thoroughly investigated.

 

According to Jimu News, behind this trafficking case lies an extremely mature, large-scale, and clearly divided black industry chain. From contacting buyers and sellers to handling the “laundering” of birth certificates, to the final transaction link, the entire process is a “corporate” operation.

 

The report said that the root cause of the repeated crackdown on the evil of trafficking in babies is that the Chinese people have given rise to a deformed “market demand” due to the “preferring sons over daughters” ideology and other reasons.

 

 

Human Trafficking’s Newest Abuse: Forcing Victims Into Cyberscamming

by Cezary Podkul, with Cindy Liu for ProPublica          09-13-2022

 

(ProPublica is an independent, nonprofit newsroom that produces investigative journalism with moral force. We dig deep into important issues, shining a light on abuses of power and betrayals of public trust — and we stick with those issues as long as it takes to hold power to account.)

 

The ads on the Telegram messaging service’s White Shark Channel this summer had the matter-of-fact tone and clipped phrasing you might find on a Craigslist posting. But this Chinese-language forum, which had some 5,700 users, wasn’t selling used Pelotons or cleaning services. It was selling human beings — in particular, human beings in Sihanoukville, Cambodia, and other cities in southeast Asia.

“Selling a Chinese man in Sihanoukville just smuggled from China. 22 years old with ID card, typing very slow,” one ad read, listing $10,000 as the price. Another began: “Cambodia, Sihanoukville, six Bangladeshis, can type and speak English.” Like handbills in the days of American slavery, the channel also included offers of bounties for people who had run away. (After an inquiry from ProPublica, Telegram closed the White Shark Channel for “distributing the private information of individuals without consent.” But similar forums still operate freely.)

-Cambodia, Sihanoukville, six Bangladeshis, can type and speak English, for companies in Sihanoukville targeting foreigners, people who can make decisions come chat, can deliver.

-Sihanoukville, a few Chinese born in the 90s. Cannot share pictures, no passports. Have ID cards, can interview directly. Price relatively high.

-Selling a Chinese man in Sihanoukville just smuggled from China. 22 years old with ID card, typing very slow. Only third day here. Companies who can accept slow typers come chat. 10,000 USD.

 

Listings from the White Shark Channel on Telegram Credit:Screenshots and translations by ProPublica

 

Fan, a 22-year-old from China who was taken captive in 2021, was sold twice within the past year, he said. He doesn’t know if he was listed on Telegram. All he knows is that each time he was sold, his new captors raised the amount he’d have to pay to buy his freedom. In that way, his debt more than doubled from $7,000 to $15,500 in a country where the annual per capita income is about $1,600.

 

Fan, photographed in Phnom Penh, Cambodia Credit:Cindy Liu for ProPublica

 

Fan’s descent into forced labor began, as human trafficking often does, with what seemed like a bona fide opportunity. He had been a prep cook at his sister’s restaurant in China’s Fujian province until it closed, then he delivered meals for an app-based service. In March 2021, Fan was offered a marketing position with what purported to be a well-known food delivery company in Cambodia. The proposed salary, $1,000 a month, was enticing by local standards, and the company offered to fly him in. Fan was so excited that he told his older brother, who already worked in Cambodia, about the opportunity. Fan’s brother quit his job and joined him. By the time they realized the offer was a sham, it was too late. Their new bosses wouldn’t let them leave the compound where they had been put to work.

 

 

Unlike the countless people trafficked before them who were forced to perform sex work or labor for commercial shrimping operations, the two brothers ended up in a new occupation for trafficking victims: playing roles in financial scams that have swindled people across the globe, including in the United States.

Tens of thousands of people from China, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam and elsewhere in the region have been similarly tricked. Phony job ads lure them into working in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, where Chinese criminal syndicates have set up cyberfraud operations, according to interviews with human rights advocates, law enforcement personnel, rescuers and a dozen victims of this new form of human trafficking. The victims are then coerced into defrauding people all around the world. If they resist, they face beatings, food deprivation or electric shocks. Some jump from balconies to escape. Others accept their lot and become paid participants in cybercrime.

 

 

Fan and his brother eventually ended up in Sihanoukville in a compound surrounded by a barbed wire fence. They were made to lure people in Germany into depositing funds with a phony online brokerage controlled by their operation, which also targeted English speakers in Australia and elsewhere.

“This idea of combining two crimes, scamming and human trafficking, is a very new phenomenon,” said Matt Friedman, chief executive of the Mekong Club, a Hong Kong-based nonprofit that combats what it calls modern slavery. Calling it a “double hurt,” Friedman said it’s unlike anything he’s ever seen in his 35-year career. The phenomenon has only just begun to come to light in the U.S., including in a Vice article published in July.

The most widely used technique among these operations is known as pig butchering, an allusion to the practice of fattening up a hog before slaughtering it. The approach combines some time-tested elements of fraud — such as gaining trust, in the manner of a Ponzi scheme, by making it easy for marks to extract cash at first — with elements unique to the internet era. It relies on the effectiveness of relationships nurtured on social media and the ease with which currencies can be moved electronically.

Typically, fraudsters ingratiate themselves into online friendships or romantic relationships and then manipulate their targets into depositing larger and larger sums in investment platforms that are controlled by the fraudsters. Once the targets can’t or won’t deposit more, they lose access to their original funds. They’re then informed that the only way to retrieve their cash is by depositing even more money or paying a hefty fee. Needless to say, any additional funds disappear in similar fashion.

Some Americans have lost huge sums. An entrepreneur in California said she was swindled out of $2 million and unwittingly facilitated an additional $1 million in losses by convincing her friends to join her in what seemed like a surefire investment. A hospital technician in Houston enticed her friends and colleagues to join her in a similar scheme, costing the group $110,000. An accountant in Connecticut is no longer preparing for retirement after watching $180,000 vanish in two separate swindles. They were among more than two dozen scam victims from seven countries interviewed by ProPublica.

Out of fear or shame, most pig butchering victims do not report their losses. That’s one reason that the limited data available likely understates the scale of the damage. According to the Global Anti-Scam Organization, a nonprofit founded last year to combat the new form of fraud, at least 1,838 people in 46 countries have lost an average of about $169,000 each to pig butchering since June 2021. Many still seem stunned by the effectiveness of the trickery. “I have to say, it’s brilliant,” said a Silicon Valley CEO who tallied her loss at $800,000 and asked not to be named out of embarrassment. For many victims, the betrayal by a seeming friend only compounds the devastation.

Fan’s ordeal began with a burst of optimism. He flew to Cambodia’s capital, Phnom Penh — it was his first time leaving China — and then waited out two weeks of COVID-19 quarantine in a hotel. He was then driven to a walled-off condominium complex in the city to begin his training. It was only then, in April 2021, that he realized something was off. Instead of learning about food delivery or working in a kitchen, he and his brother were placed in front of computers and told to study materials about how to defraud people online.

Fan, who is serious and reserved, with a crew cut and a round face that betrays little emotion, was able to document parts of his account, including the offer letter that drew him to Cambodia. (Fan is his family nickname; he asked that ProPublica not include his full name out of fear of his captors.) His experiences resembled those of other trafficking victims ProPublica interviewed and aligned with descriptions provided by experts and others.

Job ads, like this one on Facebook, are often used by human traffickers to lure young people into scam sweatshops in Sihanoukville. Facebook removed the post after ProPublica asked about the ad. Credit:Screenshot by ProPublica

Fan and his brother spent six months engaging in pig butchering schemes before their bosses decided to relocate the operation to Sihanoukville. The bosses presented them with a choice: They could pay the equivalent of $7,000 each to leave, or they could move along with the company. The brothers, who were paid negligible wages for their work, couldn’t afford the fee. So they relocated to Sihanoukville, in the upper floors of a hotel and casino called the White Sand Palace located in the center of the city.

The job could be terrifying. Fan said he witnessed a worker “half-beaten to death” by guards. “People were saying: ‘Help him! Help him!’” he recalled. “But nobody went up to help him. Nobody dared to.”

Only weeks after Fan and his brother arrived at White Sand, they experienced a brief moment of hope, Fan said. A person approached them and offered to get them out. With his help, they managed to leave — only to realize that the seeming savior had sold them to another criminal organization. This one was located in a fortified complex of beige dormitories on the edge of Sihanoukville with the grandiose name Arc de Triomphe. The $7,000 each owed for his freedom had risen to $11,700. And the price would go higher still.

Cyberfraud operations in Asia, including the ones Fan worked for, are highly organized. Some have gone so far as to draft detailed, psychologically astute training materials on how to dupe strangers. ProPublica obtained more than 200 such documents from an activist who helps involuntary workers escape.

 

 

Pig butchering scammers often claim that a well-placed aunt or uncle is feeding them inside information. Some training guides include talking points to teach scammers how to utilize this script effectively. Credit:Screenshot by ProPublica

Step one in the fraud process for Fan and others was to create an attractive online persona. In his case, he was expected to pose as a woman when wooing targets online. His operation bought photos and videos from websites that cater to such operations. For example, bundles of hundreds of photos of good-looking women and men are available for less than the cost of a cup of coffee from a shop called YouTaoTu. Another website markets a “pig butchering scam” package: For the equivalent of $12, it offers a “handsome guy set” of images of a man with perfectly chiseled abs. (Neither online store responded to requests for comment.) Such photos are frequently lifted from the online accounts of unsuspecting people; ProPublica found that images used by one fraudster were stolen from the Instagram profile of a Chinese social media influencer.

 

An image of a man showing off his chiseled abs is part of a “pig butchering scam” package of 197 photographs (including one of the man driving a Porsche) on sale for $12 on an online marketplace. Credit:Screenshot by ProPublica

 

Scamming guides obtained by ProPublica recommend using such photos to set up social media accounts and then bolster them with the simulacrum of an affluent lifestyle by posting photos of luxury cars, along with descriptions of relevant hobbies such as investing. Stressing your belief in the importance of family, one guide adds, is the sort of touch that helps foster trust.

The resulting profiles can seem so real that one Canadian man met his future scammer after Facebook’s algorithm suggested the person to him as a friend. The chance encounter cost him and his friends nearly $400,000, according to a police report he later filed. Other victims told ProPublica they met their scammers on LinkedIn, OkCupid, Tinder, Instagram or WhatsApp. (Meta, which owns Facebook, WhatsApp and Instagram, said it has “long prohibited this content” and is investing “significant resources” into blocking it. Match Group, owner of Tinder and OkCupid, said it’s using machine learning and content moderators to fight fraud. LinkedIn didn’t respond to emails seeking comment.)

The next step for Fan was to contact as many victims as possible. He recalled working on a team of eight under a group leader, who gave each of them 10 phones to make it easy to keep multiple chats going, along with lists of phone numbers to contact. Fan’s job was to try to initiate conversations on WhatsApp. He would do it by pretending he had reached a wrong number, a common ruse. Others would open with a simple “Hi.”

 

One former scam worker holds the phones he used to contact potential victims. Credit:Photograph provided to ProPublica

 

Some tiny percentage of people responded favorably. When they did, Fan’s job was to handle the crucial initial part of the conversation. That’s when scammers are instructed to get to know their victims and discover what one training guide calls “pain points” that can be exploited. It’s also an opportunity to do what another document calls “customer mapping,” screening potential marks to glean information on their wealth and their vulnerability to being “cut,” slang for convincing them to fall for the scheme.

 

Fraudsters often initiate conversations on WhatsApp using wrong number-type messages. Credit:Screenshot provided to ProPublica by the Global Anti-Scam Organization

Using WhatsApp offered other practical advantages. Initially, Fan said, his team was aiming its efforts at Germans. Fan doesn’t speak a word of German, but it didn’t matter. All his chats were filtered through language translation software. Later, his team shifted to marks who spoke English. If any of the potential victims wanted to hear the voice of the attractive woman he was pretending to be, Fan said, there was a woman on staff who spoke fluent English and could record voice memos for him.

Because he was a rookie, Fan’s job was mostly limited to enticing marks to download an app called MetaTrader that would provide access to a brokerage where, he told his new “friends,” they could make fortunes trading cryptocurrencies. Fan would try to convince them to buy cryptocurrencies such as ethereum or bitcoin and deposit them in a brokerage controlled by the scam operation. The brokerage would then post phony numbers, including ones that represented supposed gains in their accounts.

If customers complied and began depositing significant sums, Fan said, he would typically hand the phone to his boss, who would take over and begin prospecting for a major strike. The strategy squares with what several scam victims told ProPublica: They sensed they were talking with multiple people. Indeed, they often were.

 

Why MetaTrader Is a Favorite Tool for Pig Butchering

Consumers who file complaints about pig butchering with the Federal Trade Commission routinely mention MetaTrader as a conduit for fraud. Among 716 such complaints filed since June 2021, consumers reported losing $87 million, FTC data shows. Separately, ProPublica identified 60 fake brokerages that have used MetaTrader for pig butchering.

Why has the app become such a staple of these scams?

MetaTrader isn’t a brokerage. It’s a platform. It’s analogous to using Amazon’s website to buy products from other retailers. Only in the case of MetaTrader, customers use the platform, typically via its phone apps, to access online brokerages where they can trade foreign currencies or other financial instruments. Both Apple and Google distribute MetaTrader in their app stores, giving it broad availability and a patina of legitimacy. (One training manual advises pig butchering fraudsters to cite its distribution by Apple as proof that MetaTrader can be trusted.)

However, MetaQuotes, the Cyprus-based company behind MetaTrader, allows brokerages that it contracts with to sublicense MetaTrader software to other brokerages with few checks to ensure the legitimacy of the sublicensed operations. This has allowed scammers to use MetaTrader as a front for fraudulent websites. Victims who are bilked via MetaTrader see records of trades and account balances, seemingly allowing them to control their money, when in fact that money is already in the swindlers’ possession.

ProPublica shared the list of fake brokerages and the FTC complaints with MetaQuotes CEO Renat Fatkhullin, along with a detailed list of questions. He did not respond. A lawyer for MetaQuotes told one victim that it is “solely a software development company” and has “nothing to do with any complaints of traders against companies that use the software of our clients.” An Apple spokesperson said the company has shared complaints with MetaQuotes, claiming that MetaQuotes has taken steps to respond to the complaints. The spokesperson provided no examples. Google did not respond to a request for comment. The FTC declined to comment.

About 8,000 miles from Cambodia, an American who lives near San Francisco got a WhatsApp message on Oct. 7, 2021, from a stranger calling herself Jessica. She seemed to have reached him by mistake. Jessica asked the man, whose middle name is Yuen, if they knew each other; she said she had found his number on her phone and didn’t know why. Yuen responded that he didn’t know her. But Jessica was chatty and friendly, and her photo was alluring, so they kept talking.

Yuen agreed to tell his story on the condition that ProPublica identify him only by his middle name and omit certain details that could identify him. He saved his chat history with Jessica, which would run to 129,000 words over several months, and later shared it with ProPublica. (Yuen also shared his chat history with Forbes.)

At the moment Jessica initiated contact, Yuen was vulnerable. His father was in a hospital, dying from a lung disease. He had entrusted Yuen, the youngest of four siblings, with the power to decide whether to cut off his life support. It would also be up to Yuen to plan his father’s funeral and distribute his estate.

The family had immigrated to the U.S. from Hong Kong decades earlier. Yuen, who is in his early 50s and works as an accountant for a major university, was more affluent than his siblings, who are all older than him. He felt it was his duty to take care of them in old age, much as he was caring for his father and had cared for his late mother. Jessica told him she admired his commitment to his family. She shared her own tale of having a grandfather in the hospital.

 

Yuen began trading messages with a stranger named Jessica on WhatsApp in October 2021. Credit:Brian Frank, special to ProPublica

 

Jessica was, by all appearances, a savvy and talented woman. She claimed to be a Chinese immigrant herself, a private banker at J.P. Morgan Chase in New York City. (A Chase spokesperson said the bank has no current employee with her purported Chinese name, Wang Xinyi.) Jessica’s photographs showed her spending weekends on Long Island playing with her rich friend’s toddler. She seemed fashionable, loved shopping and found time for yoga nearly every day, and she would flirt with Yuen. When Jessica posted photos of herself at a luxurious beach property, he wrote, “Wish I was there now.” She replied, “We can go play together.”

 

Text exchanges between Jessica (gray) and Yuen (green) Credit:Screenshots provided to ProPublica

 

One Monday in late October, Jessica told Yuen she had just made $100,000 trading gold contracts. She let him in on a secret: She had a rich uncle in Hong Kong who had his own team of analysts who fed her inside quotes about where the price of gold would move. Every time “Uncle,” as she referred to him, called with news of where the market would go, she could make a guaranteed 10% profit by trading on his directions.

Jessica offered to teach Yuen — but only him. “Why just me?” he asked. Jessica said it was because she sympathized with Yuen about his dying father. “The money you earn can better help your father,” she explained. Plus, she knew she could trust him to keep her secret about insider trading. “Of course, I won’t tell anyone,” Yuen told Jessica as he pondered whether to join in.

The exchange marked a key moment in Yuen’s relationship with Jessica. The person behind Jessica’s alter ego was using a manipulation technique called “altercasting,” according to Martina Dove, a psychology researcher and author of “The Psychology of Fraud, Persuasion and Scam Techniques,” who reviewed Yuen’s chat log at ProPublica’s request. It puts the scammer in a position of trusting the target so that the target will reciprocate trust later on. Keeping the trading secret also meant less chance that Yuen’s wife or teenage daughter would learn about his chats with Jessica.

When Yuen agreed to put some money into gold, Jessica told him to download MetaTrader from Apple’s app store. She then told him to use the app to search for a brokerage called S&J Future Limited.

Yuen made it clear he couldn’t afford to lose any money. If he did, he said, he’d have to kill himself. Jessica said there was no need to worry: Uncle was never wrong. Yuen owed it to his father to seize the opportunity.

On Oct. 26, the day he had to go to the hospital to discuss his father’s end-of-life care, Yuen put money on the line for the first time. A conservative investor and lifelong saver, he’d been petrified to put even $2,000 into the brokerage. Jessica convinced him to start with $10,000 and taught him the two-step process to fund his account. First, he wired money from his bank to buy a cryptocurrency called ethereum. Then he could transfer the ethereum to a crypto wallet, whose address she provided.

Jessica insisted that using a cryptocurrency would help Yuen minimize his tax burden. He admitted he had very little idea of what he was doing. No matter. When the transfer was done, his S&J account reflected the deposit. And the next day, when Uncle called Jessica with news, Yuen was ready to buy. His account showed he made $746 after fees.

Jessica claimed she had made $500,000 on the same trade. She told him to get his account up to $50,000 to start earning meaningful sums. Yuen agreed and wired $20,000 the next day and another $20,000 a few days after that. When Jessica saw that he was doing as she’d directed, she praised him — “you’re smart” — and reminded him that the more money he put in, the more he’d earn for his father and siblings.

Little by little, Jessica encouraged Yuen to invest more and more. Yuen liquidated some mutual funds and wired nearly $58,000 on Nov. 2. When Uncle called with news later that night, his MetaTrader account showed an eye-popping gain of $17,000.

In those early weeks, Yuen was thrilled with Jessica. He called her his “true angel” in one message and offered up emojis of joy. Jessica wrote back: “I am not an angel, I am a demon.” She added two smiley-face emojis.

If Cambodia has a capital of fraud, it may well be Sihanoukville, which is named for the country’s onetime king who was ousted in an American-supported coup during the turmoil that erupted as the U.S. bombed the nation during the Vietnam War. The city has transformed over the past five years from a quiet beach resort to a metropolis of casinos and ghostly towers in various stages of construction or decay. The building boom was funded by Chinese investors, who started pouring millions of dollars into Sihanoukville after 2016, when the Philippines launched a crackdown on illegal online gambling outfits that were aimed at Chinese citizens. Cambodia had looser gaming regulations, and its government welcomed Chinese investment, making it a perfect substitute.

Soon Cambodia experienced the same influx of organized crime that had prompted the crackdown in the Philippines. Cambodia, under pressure from the Chinese government, announced a ban on online gambling in August 2019. Months after that, the COVID-19 pandemic struck and casinos in Cambodia were suddenly emptied of customers and workers.

Criminal syndicates repurposed their emptied real estate and began using it for scamming operations, according to Jason Tower, Myanmar country director for the United States Institute of Peace, and other observers in the region. “They’re criminal businesses, but they’re businesses at the end of the day,” he said. “So what did they do? They adapted.” And thanks to the pandemic, human traffickers found no shortage of job seekers with computer skills.

Forced Labor Compounds Have Spread Across Cities in Cambodia and Elsewhere in Southeast Asia

 

Credit:Map by Lucas Waldron, ProPublica. © OpenStreetMap Contributors. Research by Danielle Keeton-Olsen.

 

These facilities, which are housed in everything from office buildings to garish casino complexes, aren’t all tucked away in isolated neighborhoods. Some are prominently situated in the heart of cities. The White Sand Palace, which contains not only a gambling establishment but also multiple floors of fraud operations, according to former workers there, is located diagonally across the street from the summer residence of the Cambodian prime minister. White Sand didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Scam operations are often in central locations. The White Sand Palace in Sihanoukville is only a block or so from the prime minister’s summer residence. Credit:Photo by ProPublica

Many fraud operations are surrounded by barbed wire fences. It’s routine to see windows and balconies completely enclosed by bars. In the Chinatown area of Sihanoukville, storefronts for a noodle shop and a barbershop look unexceptional, until you walk inside and notice that there are bars inside preventing anyone from exiting the complex of heavily guarded buildings.

 

The beige stretch of towers, center, and the buildings to the left, located in the Chinatown area of Sihanoukville, house scam operations, according to people who say they were held captive there. Credit:Cindy Liu for ProPublica

 

Over the past year, an array of activists, journalists and nongovernmental organizations in Southeast Asia have begun revealing what’s going on behind the bars in these buildings. Ngô Minh Hiếu, a reformed hacker who now works as a cybersecurity analyst for the Vietnamese government, was one of the first to identify the sites. NGOs such as the International Justice Mission, as well as local media outlets, most notably VOD News, have revealed details of the operations. (ProPublica collaborated with three reporters affiliated with VOD to prepare this article.)

 

Lu Xiangri, a survivor of human trafficking who became a rescuer, wears a red bracelet he received at a pagoda where he prayed for people trapped in scam compounds. Credit:Cindy Liu for ProPublica

 

 

Others, such as Lu Xiangri, who became a volunteer rescuer after escaping a Sihanoukville scam sweatshop, have collected videos depicting abuses in these operations. Lu witnessed severe mistreatment when he was briefly detained inside the Arc de Triomphe last October: He saw a man with a broken leg and a bruised back begging to be sold so that he could avoid further beatings; Lu said the man later died of his injuries. Determined to help others avoid a similar fate, Lu joined a volunteer rescue team, which exposed him to a steady stream of pleas for help that often include graphic images of wounds left by electric shock batons and other corporal punishment. (ProPublica examined scores of similar photos and videos, some of which depict torture — including the use of electronic shock devices on workers’ genitals — but is publishing only a limited number whose authenticity was verified by Lu.)

The following images show the beating and torture of captive workers in Cambodia. Two photos depict partial nudity to show the extent of the bruising. ProPublica has obscured the faces of the victims.

 

View Image

Large numbers of graphic images of abuse and torture inside scam compounds are circulating online. The authenticity of these photographs was confirmed by Lu, who has helped people escape forced-labor operations. Credit:Photos obtained by ProPublica

ProPublica drove up to the gates of three compounds in Sihanoukville where people have alleged being detained and compelled to work as fraudsters. They included the Arc de Triomphe, one complex in Chinatown and another sprawling compound known as White Sand 2. Security guards at the three locations either denied that anything illegal goes on inside or refused to answer questions. “Talk to the boss,” one said, without specifying who the boss was.

Alleged scam compounds in Sihanoukville Credit:Cezary Podkul/ProPublica

 

Fan said his life was tightly circumscribed when he worked and lived inside the Arc de Triomphe compound. He could leave his building and enter an adjoining casino and karaoke bar — he said he had no interest, though some workers did gamble or go to the karaoke bar — but the presence of guards would dissuade any hopes of going out into the street. During the four months he was at the Arc de Triomphe, he said, he never set foot outside the compound.

His schedule and routine were regimented. Fan worked on the second floor of a building from 5 p.m. to 9 p.m., then again from 11 p.m. to 5 a.m. He slept in a dorm room with metal bunk beds, with four or five people per room. There was even a small clinic in the compound that provided first aid and rudimentary medical treatment. As Fan put it: “You can’t go anywhere. You’re either eating, sleeping or working.” The days ran into each other, and Fan tried to anesthetize his own feelings, willing himself into emotional torpor. His only pleasure came from playing a fantasy warfare game on his phone each night before going to bed.

 

The Arc de Triomphe compound in Sihanoukville Credit:Cindy Liu for ProPublica

 

Fan hated the work. Cheating people out of money was the last thing he thought he’d be doing when he answered a job ad. But he couldn’t leave the compound, nor could he afford to buy his way out. His bosses at the Arc de Triomphe demanded $23,400 for him and his brother. The two were essentially paid on commission, which meant that the more he wanted his freedom, the more he’d have to bilk.

In part because he would hand over promising targets to his boss, but perhaps also because of his reluctance, Fan never delivered a big score. The most he landed was $30,000. He said he felt so terrible after that “success” that he deleted the victim’s contact information from the organization’s database to make sure the person couldn’t be further stripped of cash. Others on his team, he said, extracted as much $500,000 from a single victim.

On Nov. 3, as Jessica was helping him turn his newest deposit of $70,000 into cryptocurrency, Yuen got a message that his father had been taken to the hospital. Yuen raced to join him, and as he sat in the waiting room, some other news came through. It was Jessica, saying her uncle in Hong Kong had given her another signal to trade.

Yuen explained to Jessica that his father was dehydrated and losing the will to eat. He was back in the hospital two days later, crying as he wiped his father’s hands and face. Shortly after, Jessica messaged to ask if his latest deposit of $20,000 had gone through. Yes, he said. He added that he’d decided to give his father comfort in his dying days by moving him to a hospice.

Jessica didn’t seem to grasp what a hospice was. When Yuen explained that it was a care facility for the terminally ill, she perked up: “You need to make more money.” Jessica told him he should raise his account balance to $500,000 so he could cover the cost more easily.

Over the next nine days, Yuen cashed in a $20,000 CD that his mother had bequeathed him and his siblings and tapped a dormant home equity line of credit for $200,000. Each time he traded with Jessica, his account showed an increase, and soon he surpassed the $500,000 mark she’d set out for him.

 

As Yuen was moving his father into hospice, Jessica pressured him to increase his deposits. “You need to make more money,” she told him. Credit:Brian Frank, special to ProPublica

 

Yuen’s father died in the early morning hours of Nov. 14. Yuen was the only one with him when he breathed his last. He wrote Jessica, seeking sympathy, but got a perfunctory response. This is a common stratagem, said Dove, the psychology researcher. She calls it “scarcity”: withdrawing attention unless the target is doing what the scammer wants. When Yuen wanted to talk about anything related to money, Jessica engaged. When he wanted her attention for anything else, she was distant and tried to steer the conversation back to investing.

The next day, with his father now gone, Jessica gave Yuen another goal. She bragged that she was buying yet another home in New York. The conversation turned to real estate and how Yuen could afford a pied-à-terre there. Why, he asked? “So that we can get very close,” Jessica responded. She explained that Uncle had told her a “big market” was coming soon. “If you want to buy a house in New York, you need to increase your capital,” she said.

In just a few weeks of trading, Yuen had shed much of his previous caution. But now he resisted. He was planning his father’s funeral, he told Jessica, and he was overwhelmed at work. Buying a home in New York would have to wait. Jessica urged him to take out another loan. When Yuen refused, she chided him: “You are a wise man, this is borrowing a chicken to lay eggs.” But Yuen didn’t budge.

By Nov. 18, he had gone six days without depositing more money into his account. That’s when his investing idyll came to an end. That day, his MetaTrader app suddenly closed him out of his positions. By the time it was over, his account showed a balance of minus $480,000.

Yuen panicked. He couldn’t lose any of this money, but he felt he couldn’t turn to anyone for help, either. He’d been keeping his MetaTrader habit secret. He lied to his wife and daughter when they asked who he was messaging so frequently, brushing it off as an endless stream of work requests. His siblings didn’t know either. No one knew. No one except Jessica.

Jessica convinced him it was his fault. He must have exited the MetaTrader app instead of following her directions. But it was OK, she said. The big market was still there and he could make everything back quickly. “Prepare the funds and earn them back,” she said.

Yuen didn’t know it, but he had now entered the final stage of pig butchering. This is when scammers sense that their targets have been squeezed dry and are unlikely to deposit more funds. They then shift to the final manipulation: Making the targets aware that they’ve lost all their money and offering them a seeming lifeline to earn it back. The move aims to heighten the targets’ distress. “We normally don’t make our best decisions when we’re in a state of emotional arousal,” said Marti DeLiema, a gerontologist at the University of Minnesota who researches how older Americans are swindled.

Yuen immediately dialed up the financial institutions that managed his family’s savings and ordered a sale of $500,000 worth of mutual fund shares. As he waited for the money to be transferred, he debated whether to inform his family about the loss. Jessica told him, via an emoji depicting an index finger over closed lips, not to say a thing. If he’d only wait a few more days and deposit more funds, he’d turn his loss into a gain. “Yes, we will earn it back,” Yuen said.

The following week, Yuen borrowed $100,000 from his brother-in-law and resumed trading with Jessica as he made final preparations for his father’s funeral. On the day of the funeral, he messaged Jessica. “When I was crying today,” he wrote, “I wasn’t sure if I was crying because I lost my father or I lost all the money.” She responded, “Money can be earned, but people are gone if they are gone.” Yuen thanked Jessica for her help.

Midway through the following week, Jessica pushed him to borrow even more, but Yuen said he had no one he could turn to. Jessica wasn’t buying it. “I don’t think you’ve reached your limit,” she said, adding that every time she had asked him to gather cash before, he’d been able to do so.

When she pushed him again the next day, Yuen exploded. “Omg.!!!” he wrote. “You don’t understand! I have no more resources to get anymore money!” By that time, he couldn’t sleep or eat or do anything other than worry about how to make back his losses.

On Dec. 3, at 11:31 a.m., Jessica messaged Yuen to get ready to do another trade with Uncle’s news. Three minutes later, Yuen executed his 23rd trade with Jessica. Once again, disaster struck: All of his positions suddenly got closed, and his entire portfolio vanished as he watched.

Yuen convulsed with panic. He spent the next several hours in shock and terror as the consequences of the loss raced through his mind. “Give me a solution,” he begged Jessica. She told him to put more money in. When he told her that all he had left was $105, Jessica answered: “With $105, start from scratch, I believe you, you can do it.”

Later that day, Yuen confessed to his family. He told his wife he’d lost 30 years’ worth of their savings. He later admitted that the money he’d borrowed from her brother and the bank was also gone. In all, he had lost just over $1 million. Yuen asked his brother to call an ambulance to escort him to a psychiatric ward, where he was placed on a suicide watch.

If you or someone you know needs help with suicidal thoughts, you can call or text the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline at 988.

Yuen was released two days later and spent December wondering what had happened. Jessica stopped replying to his messages after a few days, but he kept on asking. “It’s Christmas. Hope you have the heart to help me!!!” he messaged on Dec. 25. (ProPublica got no response to messages it sent to the WhatsApp number used by Jessica.)

Yuen said he didn’t accept that he’d been cheated until after Jan. 1. It was only through the intervention of close friends and relatives that he acknowledged what had happened. He found a support group, the Global Anti-Scam Organization, and began piecing together details of the scam, like a Reddit post warning that S&J Future Limited was a sham brokerage. A fellow victim set up a GoFundMe page to help him, and others began to chip in, including a Massachusetts woman who had lost $2.5 million herself.

 

In the end, Yuen lost $1 million, more than he and his wife had saved over 30 years. Credit:Brian Frank, special to ProPublica

 

But Yuen still struggled to comprehend what kind of person — and where? — would impose such suffering on someone else. He got a partial answer on March 31. That’s when Jessica contacted him again using a different phone number. Yuen was prepared: Another GASO member had taught him a trick to track down a person’s IP address to figure out their location. The chat log shows Jessica fell for the ruse. When the IP information came back, Yuen said, it indicated Cambodia.

Well before then, Fan and his brother had passed the point of desperation. They began seeking ways out of the Arc de Triomphe. In late January, Fan messaged the governor of Preah Sihanouk province via Facebook. The governor’s office responded, asking for Fan’s phone number, he said, and soon after the police called.

But the attempt backfired. Fan’s bosses found out about the call and summoned him and his brother. They berated the two for tarnishing the company’s reputation and threatened legal consequences, according to Fan. The meeting culminated in a videotaped confession in which Fan’s brother read a statement, on behalf of both brothers, prepared by their bosses. A video recording shows Fan’s brother reading a script in which he stated that they had gotten a “personal loan” from the company and had to repay it. He ended by saying, “We would like to apologize to the provincial governor.”

When Fan returned to his desk, his boss was furious. The boss slapped him, Fan said, threw a water bottle in his face and told him to go find the money to pay for his freedom. His boss warned him, according to Fan, that “it doesn’t even matter if you die in here” because it would be so easy to kill him. No one would care. (At least six dead bodies have been discovered in the marshlands or beaches near Sihanoukville’s scam compounds, many of them Chinese men.)

Fan’s police report turned him and his brother into troublemakers in the eyes of their employer. They got sold to another fraud operation, this one back in Phnom Penh, which tacked on further charges to their debt. Each now would have to pay $15,500 for his freedom.

 

Fan stands on the roof of the guesthouse he stayed in after his escape. Credit:Cindy Liu for ProPublica

 

In February, Fan found a way to get out. He noticed that his new bosses were less strict about security than his previous captors. They occasionally allowed workers to venture outside the compound. So Fan came up with an excuse — visiting a friend — and received permission to leave. He suspects that his captors let him go because they believed that, as long as they still held his brother, he would return.

But Fan didn’t return. Meanwhile, his brother called the police, and this time they came through. He was released at the urging of local authorities. But before his brother left, he was forced to confess again, this time in writing. That handwritten letter, which Fan shared with ProPublica, stated that he had borrowed $31,000 from the company, was happy and working voluntarily and had never been kidnapped or beaten.

Fan spent his first months of freedom in the Great Wall Hotel, a modest five-story guesthouse steps away from Phnom Penh’s airport that has become a haven for Chinese scam workers who manage to escape. Life at the Great Wall was safe but monotonous. Most residents were just passing the time as they waited for an opportunity to return to China, which has restricted travel due to its zero-COVID-19 policy. Those limits contributed to rising costs for airline tickets, putting a return nearly out of reach for many of the escapees.

In June, Fan moved out of the Great Wall Hotel. He declined to reveal his exact whereabouts, as he’s still afraid that he will be abducted by bounty hunters. Fan has obtained paperwork that will allow him to return to China without his passport, which a scam compound still holds, and his father recently managed to cobble together enough money to pay for him to fly home. Fan dreams of returning to work on his family’s farm, tending to ducks and chickens while safely under his parents’ roof. “I won’t come out to work again,” Fan said. “There’s not much future working for other people.”

 

The front desk at the Great Wall Hotel in Phnom Penh Credit:Cindy Liu for ProPublica

 

Cambodia’s fraud operations often have links not just to organized crime but also to the country’s political and business elites. The Arc de Triomphe, for instance, is owned by K99, a real estate and casino junket operator led by Rithy Raksmei, brother of the late tycoon Rithy Samnang. Samnang was also son-in-law to ruling party senator Kok An, whose business empire includes properties that have faced allegations of forced scam labor. And the complex in Chinatown has a hotel that is part-owned by Xu Aimin, a Chinese fugitive who was sentenced to 10 years in prison for masterminding an illicit international gambling ring. (None of these individuals or entities have been prosecuted for involvement in Cambodian scam compounds and none responded to ProPublica’s requests for comment.)

In July, the U.S. State Department downgraded Cambodia to the lowest tier on its annual assessment of how well countries are meeting standards for eliminating human trafficking. The department asserted that Cambodian authorities “did not investigate or hold criminally accountable any officials involved in the large majority of credible reports of complicity, in particular with unscrupulous business owners who subjected thousands of men, women, and children throughout the country to human trafficking in entertainment establishments, brick kilns, and online scam operations.” A United Nations special rapporteur on human rights in Cambodia put it in searing terms in an August report: Workers trapped in Cambodian scam compounds are experiencing a “living hell.”

The day the U.N. report appeared, Cambodia’s government reversed months of denials and acknowledged that foreign nationals have been trafficked to the country to work in gambling and scam operations. Cambodian Interior Minister Sar Kheng condemned what he called “inhumane acts” and expressed regret. The statement came only days after a dramatic, widely seen video emerged of some 40 Vietnamese men and women breaking out of a reported fraud compound and, chased by baton-wielding men, frantically jumping into a river that divides Cambodia from Vietnam.

Cambodia’s senior official working to combat human trafficking, Chou Bun Eng, told ProPublica in a July interview that her government was still figuring out how to respond to scam sweatshops. “This is new for us,” she said. Top officials from Cambodian police, immigration and other government agencies met in Phnom Penh in late August to discuss a strategy. They pledged action, then almost immediately, the government’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation undercut that stance by releasing a statement in September asserting that human trafficking in Cambodia is “not as serious, bad as reported.”

Lacking any form of legally recognized status, escapees from scam compounds are left at the mercy of Cambodian police, who often treat them as illegal immigrants or criminals. Rescued people frequently end up in crowded immigration detention centers, sleeping on the floor in tight quarters without any air conditioning, according to images shared by a detainee.

The police have sometimes pursued the rescuers. Chen Baorong, the former head of a charity group that helped human trafficking victims escape, was arrested in February and charged with incitement. In late August, he was sentenced to two years in prison. Lu Xiangri, the volunteer rescuer, took up Chen’s mantle after his arrest, only to himself flee Cambodia in July out of concern for his safety. In response to questions from ProPublica, Cambodia’s General Commissariat of National Police wrote that ​​“it is not the government policy to collude with any criminal group or facilitate the use of Cambodian soil by criminals as a hotbed for fraudulent activities overseas.”

 

Lu in Sihanoukville in May, before he fled Cambodia Credit:Cindy Liu for ProPublica

 

The governments of China, Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand and Vietnam have issued warnings in recent months about high-salary job offers emanating from Cambodia. Authorities in Taiwan and Hong Kong have gone so far as to station workers at airports to question people emigrating for work and to warn them about overseas employment scams. Still, even as the governments issue warnings about Cambodia, new operations are gravitating to places like Myanmar, where the violent aftermath of a military coup has created an opportunity for criminal syndicates to expand.

 

In the U.S., law enforcement and victims are trying, against long odds, to recapture lost money. In May, the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office seized $318,000 of stolen crypto funds on behalf of one pig butchering victim. Erin West, the deputy district attorney spearheading the effort, said her team has been able to seize an additional $233,000 since then and has a few more seizures in the works. Still, most funds aren’t recovered, and the chances drop rapidly as time passes.

Yuen is losing hope that he’ll recover his funds. At one point, he turned down an offer from a self-described hacker to introduce him to an FBI agent who would track down his stolen funds if Yuen paid him $5,000. Cautious, Yuen asked to see a photograph of the agent’s FBI identification. The badge looked authentic, as did the photo ID. But under the photograph, Yuen noticed the signature. It read “Fox Mulder,” the name of the fictional detective on “The X-Files.”

 

 

 

Rereading:Jiangxi Gang Raised 40 People in Captivity, Removed 23 Kidneys

Packed the Kidneys with Seafood and Shipped them by Air

 

The Beijing News Report                                    2014-08-10

 

 

In July, the Qingshan Lake District Court in Nanchang, Jiangxi tried the case of illegal organ trading, and revealed the secret kidney trading chain: recruiting donors from the Internet, raising donors in captivity, taking kidneys, transporting them by air, and transplanting them in just 5 months. The criminal gang raised nearly 40 people, sold 23 kidneys, and made illegal profits of 1.548 million yuan.

 

Most of the members of this huge kidney trafficking gang spanning Jiangxi and Guangdong were living kidney donors or recipients. They are at the bottom of the profit chain, and at the top of the profit chain are kidney transplant hospitals and pharmaceutical companies. The two colluded to grab most of the profits. .

 

The huge gap in demand for kidney sources provides survival and profit margins for the kidney trading group. Experts believe that a well-designed system for cadaveric organ donation will help narrow the gap.

 

In October 2011, Wang Hu (pseudonym) stayed here for more than half a month in an unremarkable small hotel near the Honggutan second-hand car market in Nanchang, Jiangxi.

 

He can’t go out at will. Zhao Zhen, a Shandong native with a height of more than 1.8 meters, closely guards him 24 hours a day and provides him with meals. Wang Hu said that he eats and sleeps every day, “just like being raised in captivity.”

 

One night more than 20 days later, a white Toyota car took Wang Hu out of the hotel. In the car, Wang Hu was blindfolded. After taking off the blindfold, Wang Hu found himself in an ordinary ward, where five medical staff were standing by the operating table and staring at him.

 

Wang Hu is a living kidney donor recruited from the Internet by a kidney trafficking group, and is the first link in the kidney trafficking chain. The members of the gang headed by Chen Feng have a clear division of labor, raising donors in captivity, taking kidneys, transporting them to different places, and transplanting them, forming a tight chain of kidney sales interests.

 

In July 2014, the People’s Court of Qingshan Lake District, Nanchang, Jiangxi made a first-instance verdict on this huge organization selling human organs. The 12 defendants were sentenced to 2 years to 9 years and 6 months in prison for the crime of selling human organs.

 

Soliciting Kidney Sellers Online

 

The living kidney donors are young men in their 20s to early 30s. They sell their kidneys for “quick money.”

 

Anhui youth Wang Hu made the decision to sell his kidney out of anger.

 

In September 2011, 21-year-old Wang Hu had a big quarrel with his father. He seldom traveled far and was determined to work hard outside. Once he was wandering the Internet and saw a publicity about selling kidneys to make money, so he contacted the netizen “Jiangxi Xiaoli” through QQ.

 

“Jiangxi Xiao Li” told Wang Hu that he could get 25,000 yuan for selling a kidney. In order to prove to his father that he could be independent, Wang Hu, who was 21 years old at the time, agreed to sell his kidney somewhat “pissed off”. Under the guidance of “Jiangxi Xiaoli”, Wang Hu arrived in Nanchang. In Nanchang, Wang Hu was “raised” in a cramped small hotel as a living kidney donor. The young man who took care of him was Zhao Zhen, who was also a living kidney donor.

 

Half a month later, Wang Hu was taken to a private hospital for a physical examination, but the matching was unsuccessful. A week later, he was taken to the Jiangxi Provincial Armed Police Hospital for a physical examination, and this time the match was successful. Successful matching between recipients and donors is a key part of kidney transplantation. According to the needs of recipients, donors are screened for matching, and only those with successful matching can undergo kidney transplantation. Because the matching rate is very low, some donors have not met a matching recipient after waiting for a long time, so kidney dealers have to resell the donors to other kidney dealer organizations.

 

While Wang Hu was spending time in the hotel, 27-year-old Zheng Xiping (pseudonym) was also taken to a rented house not far from Wang Hu for “captivity”.

 

Zheng Xiping is from Chenzhou, Hunan. While working in Guangzhou in 2011, he was obsessed with “slot machine” gambling, lost tens of thousands of yuan, and gradually lost confidence in life. During an online wandering, he contacted a netizen named “Mo Ge”, who told him that he could get 22,000 yuan by selling his kidney.

 

In November of that year, Zheng Xiping came to Nanchang from Guangzhou under the guidance of “Mo Ge”. After being “captive” for more than ten days, he was taken to the Jiangxi Provincial Armed Police Hospital for a physical examination and was successfully matched.

 

Donors are the source of kidney sales. “Jiangxi Xiaoli” and “Mo Ge” search for potential kidney sellers online. They usually post “quick money” and “sell kidneys” in forums and persuade interested parties to buy kidneys. guide them to Nanchang, where Zuo Handong finds a place to raise them in captivity.

 

The long-term shortage of organ sources has provided profit and living space for the black market of organs. According to the investigation by the police, from October 2011 to February 2012, the kidney sales group recruited and “raised” nearly 40 donors, and 23 live kidney donors were kept in captivity near Honggutan, Nanchang. In a small hotel or rented room, once the physical examination and type matching are successful, they will be “led” out to get a kidney.

 

Most of these living kidney donors are young guys, from the age of 20 to their early 30s. The reasons for selling their kidneys are different. Some of them are in urgent need of money to repay their debts due to business failure, some owe gambling debts because of gambling, and some because of There is a lack of bonus money for marriage, but the same thing is that they are all for “quick money”, and the income from selling their kidneys is between 22,000 and 25,000 yuan.

 

The Grass Team Takes Kidney

 

The operating room where the kidney was removed was rented from a private hospital, and the medical staff involved in the operation were recruited from multiple hospitals.

 

On the night of the successful matching, Wang Hu underwent a kidney removal operation. Before the operation, a young man named Chen Tong took out a donation book and asked him to copy it. Wang Hu wrote on the paper: “I donate a kidney voluntarily, and I am responsible for all the consequences, which have nothing to do with anyone.”

 

This donation book has no legal effect. The law does not allow transactions involving human organs. For living organ donation, the law stipulates that only spouses, direct blood relatives or collateral blood relatives within three generations, and existence due to assistance can form a family relationship. transplant.

 

After the operation, Wang Hu woke up and found that his left abdomen was wrapped in thick white gauze—his left kidney had been removed.

 

On the third day after the operation, Wang Hu was blindfolded again and took him to a big hotel to stay. Three days later, he returned to his hometown in Anhui with 25,000 yuan from Zuo Handong.

 

The other 22 living kidney donors were also operated on in this hospital. The person who set up this surgical team is the organizer Liu Yongdong. The operating room was rented by Liu Yongdong from Nanchang Huazhong Hospital. This hospital is a private hospital with general departments. The shareholders are Chen Shenglu, deputy chief physician of Jiangxi Provincial Occupational Disease Prevention Hospital, and his nephew Chen Shaohui. In Nanchang, only two public tertiary hospitals have professional qualifications for organ transplantation.

 

Each time, Liu Yongdong paid Huazhong Hospital 35,000 yuan for renting the operating room. For private hospitals, this is a lot of money. When questioned by the police, Chen Shenglu denied knowing the real purpose of Liu Yongdong’s lease of the venue.

 

The grass-roots medical team was put together impromptu by Liu Yongdong. The chief surgeon was Jiang Zhenglin invited from Guangxi, the surgical assistant was Wan Peng, a young doctor from the Jiangxi Provincial Armed Police Hospital, the anesthetist was Xiao Cong, an anesthetist at the Second People’s Hospital of Nanchang, and the two nurses also worked together. From Jiangxi Provincial Armed Police Hospital.

 

When the incident happened in July 2012, Nanchang Huazhong Hospital was sealed up by the police. The reporter searched for it at the old address recently, and the hospital’s sign has been removed.

 

For each kidney extraction operation, the chief surgeon can get a remuneration of about 10,000 yuan, while other people’s remuneration ranges from 1,000 to 4,000 yuan.

 

Liu Yongdong met the above-mentioned medical staff during his long-term medical treatment. Liu Yongdong is from Ruichang, Jiangxi. He was diagnosed with uremia and kidney failure in 2005. In 2006, he underwent a kidney transplant at the Jiangxi Provincial Armed Police Hospital. The total cost was about 150,000 yuan, almost ruining his entire family.

 

 

In 2010, Liu Yongdong suffered from renal failure again and needed to find another kidney source for a kidney replacement. Liu Yongdong said that the idea of “wanting to watch his son grow up” made him start looking for a new kidney source again.

 

Liu Yongdong contacted Zuo Handong on the Internet, wanting to know about the situation of buying and selling kidneys in the black market. In 2011, Zuo Handong pulled him to join the kidney trafficking gang.

 

Liu Yongdong told the Beijing News reporter that at first he just wanted to find a new kidney source for himself, but later he found out that it was very profitable, so he gradually became greedy and joined a kidney trafficking gang. Due to frequent visits to various hospitals in Nanchang, Liu Yongdong is very familiar with many doctors and nurses. His main job in the kidney sales team is to contact doctors and nurses. According to his confession, he received 10,000 yuan from each transaction.

 

Live the kidney in the name of seafood

 

The freshly removed kidney soaked in medicine, packed in a refrigerator, and airlifted to Guangzhou in the name of seafood

 

When Wang Hu was undergoing a kidney removal operation at Nanchang Huazhong Hospital, Mo Yongqing had already flown from Guangzhou to Nanchang in advance, waiting to bring the kidney back to Guangzhou. Soon after the operation, Chen Tong took the fresh kidney out of the hospital and handed it over to Zuo Handong, and collected 1,500 yuan from Zuo Handong for all the remuneration in the past few days.

 

Most of the kidneys handled by Zuo Handong and Liu Yongdong went to Chen Feng, a Guangzhou pharmaceutical businessman. Mo Yongqing was Chen Feng’s “horse boy”, responsible for transporting the kidneys back to Guangzhou, and was paid 3,000 yuan each time.

 

The kidneys taken from Zuo Handong were soaked in liquid medicine and placed in a refrigerator. When going through the airport security check, Mo Yongqing told the security check staff that the box contained frozen seafood. Passed smoothly every time.

 

Mo Yongqing himself once sold a kidney. Mo Yongqing’s parents owed 300,000 yuan in debt. In order to find money for emergencies, in 2010, Mo Yongqing found an intermediary in Xiamen on the Internet. The intermediary lied to him that he could get 100,000 yuan from selling kidneys. Mo Yongqing was tempted: ” I can still live without a kidney, and at that time I thought that if I had money to pay off my debts, my parents wouldn’t have to be forced to hang themselves.”

 

The first agency did not find a matching receptor. Mo Yongqing was introduced to the agency in Zhengzhou, and then to the agency in Guangzhou. “I was sold by intermediaries like a piglet, and finally met Chen Feng.” Mo Yongqing said.

 

But Chen Feng only offered Mo Yongqing 25,000 yuan, and Mo Yongqing gritted his teeth and sold his left kidney. After selling his kidneys, Mo Yongqing found that his physical strength had declined, he often had colds and fevers, and could not do heavy work. In order to help his parents repay the debt, he asked Chen Feng to borrow money again, and Chen Feng dragged him into the kidney selling business.

 

Mo Yongqing said that after having his kidney removed, he felt the pain of weakness and felt guilty every time he transported a kidney.

 

Liu Yongdong introduced that in the kidney trafficking gang, except for the medical staff, most of the participants are directly related to organ transplantation—either they were donors or recipients before, and everyone is tied to the profit chain of organ trading. After the kidneys were removed from the donors, many people voluntarily joined the kidney selling organization, because after selling the kidneys, their health deteriorated, and they were basically unable to undertake more tiring work.

 

Chen Tong, a boy from Shandong who was in charge of taking care of Wang Hu, was the partner Liu Yongdong found online in 2011. 29-year-old Chen Tong once sold his liver due to business failure.

 

The “big boss” of the kidney selling group, Zuo Handong, also sold his kidney to Chen Feng for 60,000 yuan in his early years. Later, Chen Feng took the initiative to contact him and asked him to help find a “kidney harvesting hospital”, and he then joined the kidney selling group.

 

Behind the scenes: Drug dealers colluded with hospitals

 

In order to maintain the relationship with the hospital, drug dealer Chen Feng sells more drugs, colludes with doctors, and provides illegal kidney sources

 

In the last link of the kidney sales chain, Chen Feng is the big boss behind the scenes. He is the chairman of Guangzhou Mengjiadi Trading Co., Ltd. and sells medicines related to organ transplantation. According to him, selling medicine can earn several million yuan every year.

 

Chen Feng confessed to the police that because of selling drugs, he established relationships with many transplant doctors in Guangzhou Hospital. In 2010, Zhu Yunsong, deputy director of the Kidney Transplantation Department of the Guangzhou Military Region General Hospital, told him that the supply of kidneys was very tight, and many patients were waiting for kidney transplants. Zhu asked him to go outside to contact some kidney sources for brain-dead patients.

 

In 2010, Chen Feng met Zuo Handong from Jiangxi on the Internet. Zuo Handong said that he was familiar with Jiangxi Armed Police General Hospital and could provide kidneys for brain-dead patients. Chen Feng sent Mo Yongqing to Nanchang and Jingdezhen to get kidneys from Zuo Handong, and then sold the kidneys to Zhu Yunsong.

 

Chen Feng denied that the purpose of selling kidneys was to make a profit. “I sell medicines for a very high profit, and I don’t care about the small money of buying and selling organs. The main purpose is to maintain relationships and make medicines.” Police investigation found that every time Chen Feng provided Zhu Yunsong with a kidney, He got 120,000 yuan, of which 105,000 yuan was distributed to Zuo Handong, the Jiangxi intermediary gang of the Kidney Trafficking Group, and 1,500 yuan was distributed to Mo Yongqing, who could earn more than 10,000 yuan.

 

At present, Zhu Yunsong is being dealt with in a separate case, but many uremia patients on the Internet still post to express their gratitude to him.

 

According to the law, before organ transplantation, the clinical academic and ethics committees should review the legality of the source of the organ. A reporter from the Beijing News called the person in charge of the department responsible for organ transplantation at the General Hospital of the Guangzhou Military Region the night before, asking about the formal procedures that the hospital should perform in organ transplant operations. The person in charge refused to be interviewed.

 

According to an organ transplant doctor at a tertiary hospital in Beijing, the patient undergoes a kidney transplant, and the kidney source plus operation fees and recuperation costs are about 500,000 yuan. Due to the shortage of kidney resources, it cannot be ruled out that some hospitals acquiesce in illegal kidney inflow. “Patients are in desperate need, hospitals are making money, and some doctors have acquiesced in falsified information.”

 

According to police investigation, from October 2011 to February 2012, a kidney trafficking gang headed by Chen Feng performed kidney removal operations on 23 donors. Of the 23 kidneys that were removed, 21 were transported to the General Hospital of the Guangzhou Military Region for transplantation. Two of them were transplanted by Liu Yongdong in private hospitals in Jiangxi and Guangzhou by doctors.

 

Liu Yongdong told the Beijing News reporter that in the entire profit chain, his income is only a small part, just enough to live on. In October 2011, Liu Yongdong decided to take a risk to make a lot of money. He organized a doctor to perform a kidney transplant on Ms. Luo, a uremic patient in Ruijin, Jiangxi Province, and charged Ms. Luo 415,000 yuan in cash. Liu Yongdong refused to disclose to the reporter his share of the income, only saying that “it is not a small number.”

 

Ms. Luo also confirmed this statement to a reporter from the Beijing News the day before yesterday. She suffers from uremia and has not been able to obtain a suitable kidney source. In August 2011, she contacted Liu Yongdong. In November of that year, Liu Yongdong found a matching kidney source and arranged for Ms. Luo to undergo a kidney transplant operation at Huazhong Hospital. The chief surgeon was Zhou Kaizhang, an organ transplant expert invited by Liu Yongdong.

 

Ms. Luo said that she recovered well after the operation, and thanked Liu Yongdong personally, “After all, I saved my life.”

 

Liu Yongdong is currently released on bail due to kidney failure. He said that his main concern is how to obtain a suitable kidney source and save his life. He said, “In recent years, the number of kidney sources has been decreasing. If you can get a suitable kidney source from a formal channel, no one wants to do something illegal.”

 

According to public data, currently about 300,000 people in China are waiting for organ transplants every year, but about 10,000 cases have been successfully transplanted. Many patients have to turn to illegal areas to find kidneys.

 

Zhai Xiaomei, executive director of the Bioethics Research Center of Peking Union Medical College, told reporters that living organ transplants are at the cost of harming the health of another person, and the sale of living organs is strictly prohibited all over the world. The commercialization of organ transplantation will widen the social gap, and huge benefits will even give birth to crimes and illegal acts. She said that the existing donation model in our country is far from meeting the demand, and the best way is to encourage organ donation after death.

 

 

20 Years After the World Conference on Women: Chinese Women’s Rights Advancing with Difficulty

Source: WRIC                            Translated by Tony Flannery

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Jing Zhang attended the Democracy Forum of China in Australia and gave the speech about the Chinese women’s liberation movement.

In the beginning of the 1990s, while an economically-recovering China was anxious to join the international trend, there was a popular term in China at the time: “jie gui”—to get on track, to want to link up with the world again on all fronts. Hosting the 1995 World Conference on Women became a turning point, particularly for helping the Chinese government to gradually move away from the predicament of having been isolated by Western countries after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. China actively hosted a large-scale international event, striving to participate more in international affairs. In 1991, after it had been decided that the World Conference on Women would be held in Beijing, the Chinese government began a large amount of preparation work, including revising the Law on the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women and signing the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. The official All-China Women’s Federation added over ten auxiliary groups. The 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing’s Huairou district seemed like a shot in the arm, provoking long-silent leading Chinese female intellectuals to pursue feminism and inspiring them to reconsider gender, equal rights, and the women’s liberation movement. These exemplary women were the first to realize that “women’s rights are human rights too”. With the attention of government and society on women’s rights and the women’s liberation movement, it was as though a spring breeze had caressed the parched earth. Around the time of the World Conference on Women, Chinese NGOs had already developed into six groups. The women involved were the first group of pioneers of the women’s rights movement in over sixty years of Chinese communism. Of the cohort of women’s rights activists who have appeared since the year 2000, Sun Yat-sen University’s Professor Ai Xiaoming is regarded as the primary promoter of grassroots women’s rights movements.

The deepest effect that the World Women’s Forum brought China was the rise of NGOs and loosely knit groups of grassroots women’s rights activists. Unfortunately, the government strictly controlled these groups, not letting NGOs make use of their full capabilities. It suppressed the loosely knit groups of grassroots women’s rights activists, which disabled the effective implementation of related legislation, thereby wiping out its essential meaning. Next I will divide the last several decades, particularly after the Beijing World Women’s Forum, into aspects such as political, economic, social, cultural, and the rise of NGOs to discuss the state of development for Chinese feminism and the women’s liberation movement. The data cited are all statistics published by official or semi-official Chinese organizations. It is believed that in the relevant departments, the data underwent strict screening to be approved for publication, based on the rules of the state’s Official Secrets Act.

The Misshapen Women’s Rights Movement during the Cultural Revolution

100 years ago, as various powers invaded China, they also brought with them western civilization. Chinese female intellectuals quickly cast off the burden of foot-binding and stood out in the street proclaiming new ideas of gender equality. They actively participated in the New Culture Movement and turned the page on the international media’s stereotypes. From 1912 to 1913, the female political participation movement of the early republican period initiated by Tang Qunying and other pioneering women was China’s first large-scale women’s rights movement. These women pushed straight from the stage of theoretical proof to the stage of practical struggle. One after another, they organized the three great women’s organizations: the Women’s Political Alliance, the Shenzhou [a historical name for China] Women’s World Republican Association, and the All Nations Women’s Political Participation Forum. According to accounts, because of the Nationalist government’s program to remove wording about gender equality, these women even publicly denounced Song Jiaoren, political leader and a founder of the Kuomintang, and Lin Sen, Chairman of the National Government. After this, the female political participation movement that these women promoted allowed ten female representatives in Guangdong to sit straight and strong in seats of provincial parliament, the first time this had been seen in any Asian country. The Chinese women’s liberation movement was basically in step with the international community’s, particularly in countries like England, France, and America. But a succession of civil and international wars killed the feminist zeitgeist in its cradle and destroyed the essence of the New Culture Movement. The women’s rights movement seemed like a flash in the pan.

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This is a principle of China’s traditional beauty standard for women: feet had to be three inches small to be the most beautiful (WRIC Information)”

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The 1921 New Culture Movement (Source: traditions.cultural-china.com)

After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established a new regime in 1949, a clause on gender equality was added to the new constitution because of Marxist doctrine’s abundant feminist elements. By substantiating the theoretical basis of the socialists at the level of reality, the demands of gender equality were also essential ingredients for the new rulers of modern history to begin placating the nation. The first constitution enacted in 1954 expressly stipulated that women enjoy the same rights as men in politics, economy, culture, society, and family life. But a few decades after this, Chinese women’s rights and benefits were defiled until there was nothing left. The only thing society respected was the might of Mao Zedong. After Mao launched the political movement of the Cultural Revolution, his wife Jiang Qing raised the banner of gender equality anew to achieve her own political ambitions. As part of the “Chairman Mao” convoy, the first lady reached the forefront of the political arena. Together with Vice Chairman Lin Biao’s wife Ye Qun, she entered the upper echelon of the Central Committee’s Politburo. From there she used government force to spread a fake feminism with the goal of political struggle. Chinese women regarded floral clothes, high heels, makeup, and perms as disgraceful. All over the country on giant propaganda signs seen everywhere were formidable-looking women, women wearing hard hats or standing on electrical poles. But another equally ubiquitous image made a strong contrast with this one: women with black signs hung from their necks with “slut” and “whore” written on them, women trussed up and standing on flatbed trucks or paraded through the streets on foot to be pelted with rocks and rubble and spat upon by adults and children. Ten years into the Cultural Revolution, women who had been humiliated and abused to the point of madness or death were everywhere.

In 1976, Mao died and the era of Mao was proclaimed over. China entered the first round of a new phase with Deng Xiaoping in total control of political power. After the economy had been revitalized, women’s rights and benefits were once again cast into the eighteenth level of hell [the deepest level of Buddhist hell].

The Number of Women in Politics Has Gone Down, Not Up in 30 Years

Data from the third “Social Status of Women” investigative report by the All-China Women’s Federation show that in the more than 30 years from the 1975 Fourth National People’s Congress to 2012, the proportion of female representatives at the People’s Congress always hovered around 21%. It wasn’t until 2013 that there was an increase in the number of female representatives to 23.4%, a far cry from the 30% proposed by the UN for female participation in the national legislature by 2015. 2.2% of employed women are in leadership roles in government organizations, party committees, and businesses—barely 50% of the corresponding rate for employed men. 80.5% of high-level company employees are men, while at 30.8% of these companies, men are promoted faster than equally qualified women. The All-China Women’s Federation report also reveals that the proportion of women in the People’s Congress has slid sharply in the international ranking of the proportion of female legislators, from sixteenth place in 1997 to fifty-sixth place.

In April 2010, the UN allocated 24,560,000 USD to Hunan to conduct the “Enhancing Chinese Women’s Political Participation” program hoping to improve China’s unfulfilled promise to increase the proportion of women in politics. This four-year program has already finished, but up to the present we have not seen whether there were any practical results.

In the absence of real legal safeguards, the issue of promoting female political participation in China is beyond difficult. On top of that, in an environment rife with official corruption, the process of concrete implementation or operation will naturally have a large amount of fraud, as well as cases of public persecution. Throughout this whole process, women are severely deprived of the right to participate in and discuss politics.

In Guangdong’s Foshan, female villager Li Biyun’s bitter experience with demanding political participation is a typical case. At the end of August, 2011, Foshan City’s Shunde District began elections for district- and town-level representatives to the National People’s Congress. Li Biyun exercised her right as a citizen and announced that she would run for Shunde People’s Congress representative as an independent candidate. Because Li Biyun had long paid attention to the villagers and helped defend their land rights, she was well-respected. She received the supporting signatures of 600 villagers in Rongli and became one of the candidates. Without a political background or party membership, she was followed, harassed, beaten up, and even robbed of her belongings and materials. During the next round of the election, the local election office used an illegal procedure to assign 60 people to narrow down the candidates further, and the frontrunner Li Biyun was thrown out. This provoked intense controversy among the villagers, and in the midst of the controversy someone smashed a ballot box and a scuffle broke out in which both sides sustained minor injuries.

In September 2011, Shunde police arrested Li Biyun for undermining the election. While in jail she suffered injuries from police beatings. When she met with her lawyer, she held an IV in one hand and her legs were in shackles. When Li Biyun’s case went to court, hundreds gathered holding slogans in support of her. On September 9, 2013, her charge of “undermining an election” was judged unsound and she was released.

One month later, in October 2013, the police once again used the crime of “interference with public function” to arrest and detain her. Because of netizen and media attention, on December 18, 2014 her punishment was remitted. When she was released, the police kidnapped her from jail and left her by the side of a highway. At this point she was sick, angry, and in extremis. The 46 year-old Li Biyun’s body was wracked with pain, and in January 2015 she was hospitalized for treatment.

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Left: Li Biyun in the hospital. (Provided by Li Biyun’s family)

Separately, a steelworker named Liu Ping in Jiangxi’s Xinyu City also suffered the unfairness of elections. Comparatively speaking, she wasn’t physically tormented like Li Biyun; that may be a difference between cities and rural areas. Liu Ping was born in 1964, and in 2009 was forced to retire. At the time she was 45. Since then she has advocated for paid leave and overtime pay. On May 12, 2011, Liu Ping announced that she would run for People’s Congress and introduced herself to voters. In response, she was taken away by the police and warned. The water and electricity in her house were cut off, and voters who recommended Liu Ping were all sought out by the police for “chats.” As a result, her supporters grew afraid, which harmed her candidacy. In the end, Liu Ping did not cross the threshold for candidacy, but her story did provoke public anger among netizens. This case reflects the fact that at a basic level, the government is extremely hostile to independent candidates, and making things hard for them by any means available is a widespread phenomenon. In 2014, Liu Ping was sentenced to six years in prison for holding a sign in the street demanding that Chinese high officials disclose their property holdings. (Listen to Liu Ping discuss her struggles running for office at http://youtu.be/llTVgEqsDTo.) A woman running as an independent candidate is doubly beaten down. On the one hand, male supremacy is deep-seated among current leaders, who have mixed feelings about women candidates who are not at home cooking and raising children. On the other hand, independent candidates who lack party membership and the support of party organizations will face layer after layer of impossibly difficult questioning. From the day they decide to run, they are at a disadvantage.

Going through records of the past 66 years’ of women’s participation in the highest government positions, there were a total of 6 women in the CCP Politburo, and three were wives of the founding fathers of the People’s Republic of China. On average, there was only one woman every 11 years. 90 years since the establishment of the CCP, no woman has been able to enter the highest decision-making body, the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Within the 7 members of the current decision-making level of the Politburo of Xi Jinping, there are no women as well. Among the 31 provinces of China, there have only been 4 female provincial leaders within the past 66 years, appearing on average every 16.5 years. In contrast, by the time in which the 1995 World Conference on Women was held, there were already 3 female Prime Ministers in the Arab world. The female Prime Minister of Pakistan even appointed the first female Chief Justice. Up until now, there have been dozens of female presidents and Prime Ministers in the world.

In rural areas, women account for 65% of the labor force, but occupy only 21.4% of membership in village committees, and only 1 to 2% of decision-making positions. Since 1978, the proportion of women in the National People’s Congress has hovered around 21%. This number has continued for 30 years without any substantive advance. From the Chinese government’s published data in the table below, we can see that female representation in the National People’s Congress is severely inadequate and ethnic minority representation in the National People’s Congress has not changed in 60 years. Even though the minority population has been increasing, the degree of political participation has been strictly controlled at around 14%.

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Statistics from the Women’s Federation in October, 2011 show that the economic, social and political status gained by women 10 years after the establishment of the PRC has experienced a regression. The Global Gender Gap Report issued by the World Economic Forum ranked China the 69th among 136 countries. Jiang Yongping from All-China Women’s Federation’s Women’s Studies Institute of China remarked that more and more people accept that women’s status has fallen because “it is more difficult for women to become politicians.” Political participation of women can influence people’s way of thinking. Female heads of state can utilize political power to promote the visibility of female political participation directly and quickly. After Sri Lanka’s first female president took office, she appointed a large number of female officials. As far back as the early 1990s, Norway’s female prime minister formulated a stipulation for the Labor Party that women could not account for less than 40% of all levels of leadership. Northern Europe is the region where female political participation has the highest visibility; it has basically achieved gender equality in politics and is a model for all countries.

The One-child Policy Inaugurates the Bleakest Period in Women’s Rights

In 1978, Deng Xiaoping implemented the “loosening up” policy and China’s economy began to warm up. An Indian summer of freedom briefly appeared in Chinese society: people could boldly criticize past politicians and expose the dark side of society. However, this did not cause the government’s attention to turn to Chinese women’s rights and benefits, nor was there any special assistance for women to participate in economic laws and policies. Among the CCP’s highest-level policymakers there was not even one woman. There were no female ministers in the Central Committee’s various ministries. There were dozens of provincial leaders, none of them women. Even women mayors were rarely seen. Female representatives in the National People’s Congress were few and far between. If we can say that the Cultural Revolution was when slogans of gender equality were shouted with the greatest vigor in the communist era, then after Deng Xiaoping’s economic liberalization, these slogans and the notion of women’s rights were given the highest-sounding send-off into the eighteenth level of hell.

In particular, after 1979’s nationwide forced miscarriages, forced abortions, and forced tubal ligations [sterilization] under the one-child policy, it was as though ordinary Chinese women (particularly rural women) were living in an earthly purgatory. On the one hand, pregnant women had to risk their lives trying to give birth to sons to preserve their marital homes and please their husbands because the consequences of having a girl were severe. It meant facing a lifetime of indignity and remaining undaunted. On the other hand, women had to evade arrest and abuse at the hands of family planning officials. After having the roof of their houses lifted up and everything within smashed, they still needed to come up with a plan to let all their family members survive. 30 years from 1978 to the present, living examples of families ruined by family planning policies are in every corner of Chinese cities and villages and in every street and alley. In 2013, 14 female lawyers jointly petitioned for 31 provinces to publicize decades of family planning fine accounts. Only 22 provinces’ Family Planning Commissions responded. In 2012, the total family planning fines received totaled 16.8 billion RMB, and of this amount, the fines reported by the Guangdong Family Planning were unexpectedly 1.1 billion RMB less than the fines reported by the provincial planning commission. As the government treats family planning policies and related information as state secrets, the degree to which the policy implementation has devastated Chinese women and children, including the testing processes and results from birth control medication, remain unknown to the outside world. Just what has been exposed through all manner of individual cases has revealed a panorama of horror. Two full generations of women, a population of up to several hundred million, have been deprived by the Party of their rights of ownership and control over their own bodies.

According to data from the Ministry of Health’s 2010 annual statistical report, in 1983, 14,371,843 Chinese women had induced abortions, 16,398,378 underwent tubal ligation, and 17,755,736 used intrauterine birth control. These data are only what the government itself published, and do not include data of the large number of pharmaceutical abortions popularized by traditional Chinese clinics, at-home traditional abortions, or the surgical abortions carried out in remote rural areas without proper hygiene and on ad-hoc operating tables. At the time, from the Central Committee out to the provinces, cities, and counties, the All-China Women’s Federation was China’s only women’s organization. Not only did it not help victimized women speak out, it instead often cooperated with the enforcers of family planning, arresting illegally pregnant women everywhere. It was reduced to being an accomplice in the persecution of women.

Equality in politics was completely ignored. From central to local government, no one publicly encouraged or promoted the female right to participate in and discuss politics, nor did any female politicians stand up and criticize human rights violations and harm to women’s behavior. In 2006 the government built the Chinese Museum of Women and Children, but in the exhibition hall, it went so far as to make no mention of these things that affected such a broad sweep [of society]: the policies and birth planning tools, drugs, methods, personnel, fines, and relevant data that impacted 270 million families and hundreds of millions of women. It completely ignored this period in history that lasted several decades and hurt the hundreds millions of women. The foremost female intellectuals had no opportunity to participate in politics, which was the same as not having the right to speech. Without equal political status, women were just sheep to the slaughter in a society of men’s rights. The gender equality slogans popular during the Mao era were not shouted at all during the Deng era, not even emptily.

WRIC volunteers interviewed a family whose pregnant mother died after the local Family Planning Commission forcibly induced labor. On October 14, 2011 in Jiangjia Village of Shandong’s Dongying City, Lijin County, a female villager named Ma Jihong was seven months pregnant when she was taken from the cotton fields and given a forced abortion, leading to a tragedy in which two lives were lost in a single body.

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The picture above left is Ma Jihong and her seven month-old baby, both of whom died in hospital. The picture above right is Ma Jihong and her husband’s wedding photo. The picture below shows Ma Jihong’s husband and daughter.


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Patriarchal Culture Revives after “Loosening up” Economic Control.

Deng Xiaoping’s series of policies “Loosening control of the central government,” triggered the rise of the Chinese economy. Women from cities and rural areas worked hard, believing what the government told them: “the right to food is more important than any other human rights”. After opening up, economic reforms once again caused polarization within the Chinese society. Women from different classes lost their rights in the resource distribution oriented by the market. In the 1990s, while Deng’s “Black Cat, White Cat” theory of economic development replaced the socialist principle of economic distribution, female workers were dismissed and lost the opportunity to participate in the economy. In cities and corporations, female cadres are the first targets to be eliminated. Recruiting female students and workers were called “mixing coarse grains”. As the effects of the economic reforms deepened, sex discrimination became more public and common, and patriarchal culture regained force.

In the eligibility for candidates of the Hunan province civil servants exam, there are regulations that specifically pinpoint women, e.g. candidates that have sexually-transmitted diseases or asymmetrical breasts will not be accepted. Many female workers were dismissed and many large companies and foreign corporations only employ women in their “golden years”, limiting their age to 17-20 years old, with contracts that generally last 3-5 years, terminated after completion to avoid female workers’ age of marriage, pregnancy and delivery. Some institutions even set regulations in black and white that female workers cannot become pregnant during their employment.  It was not until 2014 that a TV host from a well-known company in China and a female journalist from a famous media group told me that they both signed contracts with their units that forced them to guarantee that they would not get married within the next three years and would not have a baby within the next five years.

Female university graduates face difficulties in employment. The third survey on “Social Status of Women” conducted by the All-China Women’s Federation and the Statistics Bureau on 1 December, 2010 interviewed female university graduates about their experience in job searching, and 24.7% said they had been treated unfairly before. Even among women in higher positions of their job, 19.8% thought that their gender is an obstacle towards career advancement.

In tertiary institutions, there are written guidelines that the minimum marks for admission for boys and girls are different: the threshold for female students is higher. Some departments emphasize that they do not accept girls. The “211 Project: Report on Gender Discrimination in School Admissions in 2013” published on the Media Monitor for Women Network randomly investigated 112 tertiary institutions and found that almost 70% had limitations based on gender. Some universities have admission rules and regulations with clear statements such as “recommended for male candidates,” “suitable for male students” or “suitable for female students”. These make candidates hesitate.

In 1998, China implemented joint policies to improve the quality of labor, laying off redundant workers in factories, mines and corporations. Among these laid-off workers, 70% were female (The Maple Women’s Psychological Counseling Center Beijing: http://www.maple.org.cn/tabid/76/Default.aspx). A huge number of female workers were dismissed and became unemployed. Different levels of the government made use of the reason of “improving efficiency” to withdraw their social welfare services from corporations, such as canteens, daycare centers and kindergartens of various units, forcing them to close down. A large group of married women thus could only leave the job market and return home to take care of their children.

On the other hand, sexual division of labor became rampant once again: married women mainly work in the agricultural field and take care of small villages and their family. Young women strive to enter foreign-invested and jointly-invested factories in economically-developed coastal areas, working overtime in toxic environments without medical insurance and welfare. Long-established joint ventures around the Shenzhen area have about 70% of young, single female workers. What makes it worse is the government’s unjust retirement system, which makes it perfectly justifiable for employers to cut off job opportunities for women at an early age: a large amount of women are forced to leave the job market once they reach 45 years old, and can only go home to take care of their children and cook. This retirement system drafted by the State Council has been in use for 50 years. The “Temporary Regulation of Civil Servants” issued in 1993 still states that “men retire at 60 years old, women retire at 55 years old”. Corporations and institutions that emphasize physical labor and are less effective require their female workers to retire at 45 years old, causing women to lose chances of promotion and further prospects due to policies and systematic injustice. The loss of economic independence leads to the loss of equal status in society and the family. Work is an important channel for women to sustain connection with society and a basic way for women to participate in societal development.

Female migrant workers and “migrant brides” that return to their home village after “marrying into” different towns have no human rights whatsoever. Women make up 65% of the agricultural workforce and are an important drive in advancing agricultural modernization and new models of urbanization that emphasize harmonious interactions between the city and the countryside. Migrant brides lose their land ownership and shares in collectives. The coastal areas are better-off and government and private corporations conduct large-scale projects to buy land. Yet the right for returning “migrant brides” to the use of their land or to natural resources in collectives, the compensation, relocation, ownership of land occupied for residential use, and the dividends and shares received after collective farmland are sold are still unfairly distributed. The rights of returning “migrant brides” are not protected by law; the relevant laws on gender equality issued by the State Council are only mere scraps of paper as there are numerous village rules seriously violating the rights of returning “migrant brides”, such as that to receive compensation for their lost land. Thus a new group was formed among petitioners: “defenders for returning migrant brides”. Although returning “migrant brides” used rational, peaceful and non-violent methods to defend their rights, their problems were not solved and they were even arbitrarily detained. Not only did they fail to protect their rights, they lost their personal freedom and were intimidated. For example, 6 representatives of returning “migrant brides” in Foshan, Guangdong were detained by the police in January, 2014.

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Wong Zhuliu, representative of defenders of returning “migrant brides” holds her “Written Decision of Administrative Penalty” and tells WRIC volunteer Su Changlan at her home about the injustice she faced (photo credit: WRIC volunteer Su Changlan)

Rural Girls: the Most Vulnerable Group

In the Chinese government’s treatment of girls, the difference between cities—especially large cities—and rural areas is night and day. In remote mountain areas, education, health, and cultural activities for rural impoverished girls are almost nonexistent. Chinese official statistics show that there are 61,255,000 “left-behind children” who do not have parents present for long periods. 37.7% of rural children and 21.88% of all children nationwide are left-behind children, and 52,900,000 of them are 14 or younger.

The statistics show that at least 2 million children are living on their own. Their parents go to the cities to make money on the low-priced migrant worker market. Most rural girls are deprived of education. In regards to girls suffering sexual assault from fellow villagers or friends and relatives, cases of gang rape are often exposed in the online media, but the rapes of far more girls are hidden in the darkness of the villages, unknown to anyone. In 2013, a left-behind girl in rural Henan was raped by a 61 year-old fellow villager. It was not until she was eight months pregnant that her parents, migrant workers in Hangzhou, found out.

In a village in Guizhou’s Luzhi Special Economic Area, after Little Dan’s parents divorced, both went off in search of work. Little Dan lived with her 70 year-old grandparents, cold and hungry. In 2014, the 12 year-old Little Dan was “introduced” to a man in the village as an “adopted” child bride. Her parents did even not know until they rushed back to the village for a funeral to discover the girl had already “gotten married.” A villager said, “It’s a good thing for Little Dan to marry into another house. At home she can’t even eat her fill.” (Henan Business Daily)

WRIC volunteers exposed a tragic true story. It was a typical case of a policy problem leading to rural girls meeting heartbreaking misfortune. In Anhui Province’s Susong County, within Liuping Town’s Daban Village, there were three sisters in Deng Lurong’s family. Because their mother was unable to provide a son, she blamed herself and disappeared. The girls’ father Deng Jiechao moved far away to remarry and had a son. To evade the family planning officials’ large fine, he has not returned to the village, abandoning the three young girls to live with their grandma. As a result, their grandma was locked up by family planning officials to bring Deng Jiechao back. One night in April 2002, a young male villager named Deng Yunfei stole into the Deng home and forcibly raped the 12 year-old Deng Lurong. The three sisters were so scared that they screamed and cried. On the second day, the sisters went to where their grandma was locked up and reported the rape. After their grandma was released to return home, she found that the police and the public did nothing about the reported case, and became so angry that she fell ill and died. The three young sisters were left with no one to rely on. Not long after, Deng Lurong’s 15 year-old sister and her youngest sister, who was only about nine years old, were sold to a child trafficker by a male acquaintance. To this day there has been no news of them, and Deng Lurong, who was in a daze after suffering the attack, was sold into another village to be the wife of a poor bachelor 20 years older than her. She suffered a long torment there. After having two sons, her husband ordered her to go and be a sex slave for other men in the village. Each time she earned 10 to 20 RMB, all of which her husband collected. Often after being beaten she would hide in the mountains, sleeping outside and living like an animal. According to our understanding, after this Deng Lurong’s father returned to the village and reached an agreement with the local government. After he received 80,000 RMB in hush money, it was as though nothing had ever happened. The vanished, dead, sold, and tormented women and girls of the family were totally forgotten.

WRIC volunteers made many inquiries and even brought a reporter from a German magazine to do interviews, hoping that a record of this would cause the local government to take it seriously and that afterwards the volunteers would be able to see Deng Lurong’s face and see if there had been any slight improvement in her living situation. However, who knows whether her treatment would have returned to its original state after the volunteers left? Yet even today the Chinese government and National People’s Congress legislature cannot enact legislation for a Law to Safeguard Child Welfare. Nor can they use existing laws to safeguard children’s rights, particularly the rights of rural girls, and strictly punish those criminals who violate children’s rights.

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A WRIC volunteer finally saw Deng Lurong, who was hiding in a dark room feeding her child, unwilling to come out (Photo credit: WRIC volunteer Tan Chunsheng)

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Deng Jiechao’s younger brother selfishly sold off three of his own nieces and even harshly threatened the journalist and WRIC volunteers who paid him a visit. (Photo credit: WRIC volunteer Tan Chunsheng)

Even though some official women’s organizations have tried to help urban women who have suffered domestic violence, they have been unable to achieve real results. On April 30, 2009, Nanjing’s first domestic violence shelter opened its doors in the city’s aid station. In over a year, only two people seeking help stayed there. (From the May 15, 2010 Nanjing Daily story “How to open a protective umbrella for victims of domestic violence”) In March of 2000 in Liaoning Province, the women’s federation took the lead in establishing the country’s first provincial-level women’s shelter, calling it the “Women’s Refuge Station.” Each year, it receives more than 2000 petitions from women affected by domestic violence. Yet in six years it has only accepted slightly more than 300 “harmed women,” an average of four people each month. On October 17, 2002, Dalian’s anti-domestic violence aid shelter formally opened. In the last half year, of the over 1600 women who came to petition, not one was admitted. (From the October 3, 2011 Youth Weekend story: “Domestic violence shelters everywhere most likely forced to dismiss abused women; admission rare”) In Changsha, Hunan Province, the domestic violence shelter has been open for two months without a single person coming to request help (from the January 2, 2011 Legal Daily story: “Changsha’s domestic violence shelter is celebrated but not drawing crowds”). Based on statistics published by the All-China Women’s Federation, in the Women’s Federation system there are 3450 organizations providing shelter and assistance for women and children who have suffered domestic violence, and over 25,000 women and children have received aid and shelter. On average, each shelter organization has only admitted 7.3 women or children.

In reality, the problem of women suffering domestic violence is extremely serious. In November 2014 at the Media Dialog against Domestic Violence held in Beijing, the “Chinese Gender Violence and Male Attitudes Study” released there showed that among females age 18-49 who have or have had partners, 39% reported suffering physical or sexual violence from their partners. Over nine-tenths of these women chose to remain silent. Why is it that more and more women admit facing domestic violence yet such a pitifully small number are admitted to the shelters? The primary reason is that the requirements to qualify for shelter admission are stringent. Women who have been abused must, at the time of suffering abuse, gather identification documents, hospital and residence information, and other relevant documents and provide these to each organization before they can be admitted.

There is a series of other planned projects to care for girls. In “two-girl families” (one household with two daughters) in rural areas, families would receive a subsidy when building their homes. The parents and adult daughters (one or two) of struggling households with only daughters (one or two) would receive free training, small loans, affordable housing, and more. In a time of rampant corruption, real struggling two-girl families cannot get effective long-term assistance. The ones who profit most are the leaders who go to the countryside for inspections with the media following close behind. When the inspection ends, everything goes back to the way it was. In the last two years, many provinces have set up “Safe Islands” to care for abandoned children. Most have disappeared. After wide media coverage of “abandoned child safe islands,” there was a brief time in which every major city’s medical units constructed humane, caring, and fully equipped lodging for abandoned children. However, a few months or a year later they closed one after another due to a lack of funding and too many abandoned children. However, it is always better to have people do and try than to be apathetic. After all, this is not only a type of humane care. It is also a type of publicity channel that strengthens the culture of gender equality.

The State Council announced its second anti-trafficking plan “The National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2013-2020)”. In 2013, the Ministry of Public Security solved 4537 cases of trafficking of women and 2237 cases of child trafficking. Similar to statistics related to Birth Planning, actual statistics of trafficking cases are under “The State Secrets Law” and non-transparent. The numbers of unresolved and unreported cases of missing, abducted and trafficked persons are unknown to the public. The U.S. State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report in 2014 has classified China as Tier 2 in compliance of “minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking” (the worst ranking is Tier 3).

Legislation and policies toward maternity leave in China’s various local governments have the most effective implementation. The 62nd provision of the Labor Law states that female workers may enjoy not less than 90 days of maternity leave. Nearly all of China’s female workers can enjoy this treatment. This is the most beautiful vista in all work to protect women and children’s rights. Professional women in America commonly rest for three days after giving birth and then return to work.

Prostitution Statistics Hit Record High in 60 Years

In the area of marriage and family, women face problems in terms of assets and personal freedom. According to statistics from the Women’s Federation, among the 207 million families in China, 30% of women face domestic violence, and 90% of the abusers are men. Wives that lose economic status often have to bear in silence when their husbands abuse or humiliate them and have to tolerate when they find out that their husbands are having affairs. The domestic violence case by the well-known Li Yang shocked the Chinese society two years ago. This famous man beat his American wife until her nose was bruised and face was swollen, but not only did he feel unashamed, he even publicly noted proudly that he was thoroughly punishing Americans. It was unbelievable that some people even praised him. In China, women who depend on husbands to sustain the family and are full-time housewives are rarely treated equally and with respect in the family and society. They are the most vulnerable victims of domestic violence. On another level, the violence that women have suffered from these decades not only comes from within the family, but from the government as well: birth planning officials and workers supported by the government inflict mental and physical harm on them. Once women are discovered to have unplanned pregnancies or have given birth illegally, they will lose dignity completely, be humiliated in public and be forced into hospitals or clinics, especially in townships. Pregnant women are often tied to operation tables by male birth planning officials, who allow people to do whatever they want to these women’s wombs and their newborn babies.

Recently, due to rapid economic development, the language of consumerism became popular and the media is inundated with male-centered beauty standards, which place the focus on women’s body parts. The female body becomes a symbol of desire and a carrier exaggerated by the media that forces women to consciously change their image to fulfill high social standards and strive to search for the easiest way to make a living. Thus, many young women leave factories and go to night clubs, massage parlors, and other venues for bathing and foot massages. Now a popular nation-wide “trend” is formed: becoming concubines that live on rich men’s money. Wealthy, powerful men pay for a whole group of concubines, and Chinese women are pushed into regression to their primitive form 100 years ago. News reports reveal that a large number of corrupted officials have concubines, with some that even have almost a hundred “lovers”. The phenomenon of prostitution not only revived, but rose to greater levels. Seeing that women work hard but do not gain the same rewards, young girls, regardless of their education level, naturally turn to easier ways to earn money and willingly become concubines of wealthy or powerful men, or even become involved in prostitution or drug trafficking. According to media reports, the number of prostitutes reached 20 million in 2013, the highest number in Chinese history.

The number of Chinese women trafficked in groups by criminal rings to foreign countries for sex work is increasing, and Western governments are pressured to combat the phenomenon. Since 10 years ago, the New York police have been directing large-scale raids on areas of illegal sex work in Flushing. Prostitution activities were then moved to the better-off area on Long Island, but again got caught by the police. Photos of the sex workers were sent to the media in Chinese communities and many Chinese newspapers raced to put them in print.

I remember it was about 2006 when I was still an editor for an established Chinese newspaper in New York. I had an argument with a supervisor in our editorial department about printing out the photos of the sex workers. I was suspected to be abusing my power to stop the 7 photos of the Chinese women from appearing in our newspaper, but I persisted: if we were to publish their photos, why don’t we show the faces of the johns? Of course, in my work thereafter, I could only guarantee that no such photos would appear on the pages I was responsible for. I was not able to control how other editors dealt with these photos. After all, there were more men than women in the editorial department, and the head was always a man. On 6 February, 2015, the Paris police announced that they uncovered a large website that provided Chinese call girls in Paris. There were people responsible for every aspect of the website, and they hired about 200 call girls, all of which were Chinese, to serve wealthy Chinese men.

Drugs are closely related to prostitution. The Chinese government has not publicized specific statistics on female drug addicts and drug trafficking, but from news reports, we can see that women are involved in every procedure, including making drugs, packaging, logistics and sales. In 2011, Hunan province launched a large-scale anti-drug campaign called “Mothers Against Drugs: Blue Knot Campaign”, which held promotional activities for 29000 times, established 34000 Mothers Against Drugs Associations, and recruited 520000 Mothers Against Drugs (Statistics from Hunan Annals). Yet, Hunan Province is far from the most popular place for drug dealers, who often gather in Yunan, Guizhou and flock to the coastal areas near Guangdong.

The Ministry of Police publicized general statistics in May, 2013, indicating that the total number of drug addicts in China has reached 2220000 (http://news.eastday.com/c/20130702/u1a7493816.html). The prevalence of drugs harms women, especially mothers. Many young women with low education levels face difficulties in finding jobs and are treated unfairly in many places. At last, they sell their bodies, become sex slaves or cross the line and become criminals.

Decades of implementation of the Birth Planning Policy has led to a much smaller female population when compared to males, but the social status of women has not improved. Instead it had fallen rapidly, further weakening women as a group, leading to their lack of self-confidence and overreliance on men, usually husbands or lovers. The main reason for the regression is inequality in political participation: there are no powerful female figures and organizations to speak out for women, reveal the inequality in economic distribution, point out the harms of patriarchal society, promote feminist ideology, advance the women’s liberation movement and advocate for legal reforms to punish acts of gender discrimination. In contrast, powerful male figures can nearly ruin 100 years of achievements in Chinese women’s liberation with only a few sentences. In October 2013, Xi Jinping emphasized the female household role in a speech to the All-China Women’s Federation, saying that “women must conscientiously shoulder the burden of caring for young and old and the responsibility of educating sons and daughters. In building a virtuous home they play their role.” As a result, thousands of women’s organizations, from Beijing to the provinces, cities, counties, and villages, have launched a wave of study, even directly calling on women to study Confucianism, laundry, and cooking because “a woman’s place is the home.” This implies that China’s highest leader is encouraging a kind of reversal, reversing 100 hard-fought years of the women’s liberation movement to the 19th century. In other words, Xi Jinping is demanding that females “proactively” assume the role of harmonious homemaker, meaning even if women see their husbands with three wives and four concubines, for the harmony of the home they will not make a sound. They will just make the food, raise the kids, and stay fixed to the homemaker role. If Xi Jinping said what his predecessors were unwilling to say to the public, feminists cannot help but ask, in Xi Jinping’s view, what is men’s role in the home? Wouldn’t having Chinese women all bind their feet again better suit the female image in Chairman Xi’s mind?

NGOs Strive to Survive Through Cracks

The issue on gender came out of the theoretical work of the second-wave feminist movement, and is also the core of policies emphasized in the 1995 World Conference on Women. Gender is a fair standard used to examine the civilization level of a nation’s policy and society. The six well-established NGOs formed after the 1995 conference includes the Shaanxi Women, Marriage and Family Studies Institute, Beijing Center for Cultural Development of Rural Women, Women and Children’s Psychological Counseling and Legal Aid Service Center of Xishuangbanna Prefecture, Henan Community Education Research Center, the Maple Women’s Psychological Counseling Center Beijing and the Beijing Zongze Area Women’s Legal Aid Center (formerly Legal Studies and Service Center for Women of the Law Department of Beijing University), which received abundant funding from different sources. The characteristics of operation of these NGOs are: first, they are affiliated with a government department; second, they rely heavily on the background of their leader, i.e. the personal networks formed through the government position they work for at the same time or worked for in the past, such as Zongze Center’s founder Guo Jianmei, who resigned from her job within the government system. After handling “sensitive” cases such as advocating for Deng Yujiao and Li Ruirui, she received strong responses from the public but her center was closed down by Beijing University. Experiencing many tribulations, the center finally changed its name to Zongze Area Women’s Legal Aid Center. These NGOs basically operate in the areas of research, legal aid and psychological counseling and focus on co-operation with the government. Without saying it out loud, they categorize their effort and the success they obtain as results gained by the government units within the system, then they can fulfill their project aims. Guo describes the process: we were pulling a heavy car in the strong wind, climbing up a slope. Yet compared to NGOs that focused on actions, advocated on the streets and became established later, these older NGOs were less frequently attacked, disbanded and arrested by the government.

A fiercer activist is clear-cut feminist Ai Xiaoming, professor of Sun Yat-sen University, who fought against many forces for the opportunity to voice out for the vagina by writing and directing the Chinese version of “The Vagina Monologues”. The play made its debut at the Guangdong Museum of Art in December 2003 and received strong responses from the public. She fought against the tide and won the chance to perform in various schools, which influenced a large group of feminist followers. All these years, she has been filming videos on site to protect women’s rights, speaking out for women who faced injustice. She also advocated for children’s rights and rallied for activists who exposed the illegal construction of “tofu-dregs” schoolhouses which led to students’ death in the Wenchuan Earthquake, such as Tan Zuoren and Ai Weiwei. Her half-naked statement photo, which was forwarded vividly by netizens, marked her leading status in the ultimate pursuit of the liberation of women. In May, 2013, the Principal of Wanning Primary School in Hainan province was found to be sexually abusing many primary school girls. This was known as the “School Motel Room Case”. After the case was revealed, sex worker activist Ye Haiyan was arrested for supporting the rights of the primary school victims. To support Ye, Ai stripped her upper body naked, held a pair of big scissors and wrote on her own body “Looking for a Motel Room? Come to me, release Ye Haiyan!” “The female body has been defined as a symbol of desire. Actively stripping myself naked is an act of resistance,” she explained. Ai’s action led to widespread concern within the nation towards the “School Motel Room Case” and the victims’ defenders.

Around 2005, there were a few young women in China that started to write about sex like male authors, but they used a feminist way to directly record facts about their sex lives and their attitudes towards it. This led to personal attack on the web with merciless whips in the form of comments, and some netizens even posted a “kill bill” to threaten them to keep quiet. Female author Muzi Mei recorded stories about all men who had sex with her, and one of them was a semi-famous married soccer player. Her writing sparked off a fire within the country but almost no one pointed their finger at the married man: it was all Muzi Mei’s fault. Her book “Letters of Remaining Love” was banned with an administrative order, and a rat poison factory even announced that they registered “Muzi Mei” as the name of a kind of rat poison because she was a rat on the street that everyone wanted to smack; she had to be poisoned to prevent society from being harmed.

Some other female authors couldn’t stand the insults from the Chinese public and chose to leave China altogether and live in a faraway country. Hong Kong kung-fu star Jackie Chan, who is also a married man, had an affair in which the women give birth to a baby girl. After the scandal was exposed, not only did he refuse to acknowledge that the baby was his, he even said on TV that he did something wrong that all men do. Chan won the understanding of the Chinese public, but his “concubine” was severely criticized and left Hong Kong to hide in her hometown in Shanghai, afraid of appearing in the public. She raised the child alone.

Chinese women hoped that meetings for the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) that both ended in March, 2015, would be a turning point, especially for passing laws to stop domestic violence and sexual harassment, to protect child welfare and legalize homosexuality. Yet human rights defenders were shocked when proposals regarding women’s and children’s rights failed to emerge as almost no representatives in the two meetings sent an official draft for the laws or proposed any discussion, showing a general lack of concern. What was more malicious was that just as the two meeting were in progress, on the night before International Women’s Day, 7 female activists who had been advocating for laws to stop sexual harassment were all arrested by the police in Beijing, severely destroying their plans. After a few days, two activists were released, but the other five were charged for “crime of incitement” and are still detained. In its public announcement, Women’s Rights in China stated: this as a brutal act of random arrest and an abuse of power. It is crude behavior which shows that the Chinese government is openly disregarding human rights and women’s rights, even in the public eye. Up until 12 March, 1521 supporters of women’s rights and gender equality from over 30 countries including China, Japan, Brazil, the U.K., the U.S., Australia, Finland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and India have signed a petition to request release of the five arrested female activists. On 10 March, 2015, dozens of representatives from women’s rights organizations protested against the Chinese government’s cruel acts in front of the United Nations and supported the five feminists.

Feminism and the women’s liberation movement in China are going through a severe winter. However, it is impossible to push women’s status back to decades or even 100 years ago; history is forever weaving its way forward and those that attempt to pull history back must fail!

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The photo below shows WRIC’s staff and other women’s rights organizations protesting against the CCP’s brutal acts of random arrest and abuse of power!   (Photo credit: North Wind)

2014 Trafficking in Persons Report China: Tier 2 Watch List

Source: WRIC                            Translated by Tony Flannery

US Department of State

“We each have a responsibility to make this horrific and all-too-common crime a lot less common. And our work with victims is the key that will open the door to real change—not just on behalf of the more than 44,000 survivors who have been identified in the past year, but also for the more than 20 million victims of trafficking who have not.

As Secretary of State, I’ve seen with my own two eyes countless individual acts of courage and commitment. I’ve seen how victims of this crime can become survivors and how survivors can become voices of conscience and conviction in the cause.

This year’s Trafficking in Persons Report offers a roadmap for the road ahead as we confront the scourge of trafficking.” — John F. Kerry, Secretary of State

 

 

 

2014 Trafficking in Persons Report  China: Tier 2 Watch List

 

The People’s Republic of China (China or PRC) is a source, destination, and transit country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking. Instances of trafficking are pronounced among China’s internal migrant population, estimated to exceed 236 million people. Chinese men, women, and children are subjected to forced labor in brick kilns, coal mines, and factories, some of which operate illegally and take advantage of lax government supervision. Forced begging by adults and children occurs throughout China. There are reports that traffickers are increasingly subjecting deaf and mute individuals to forced labor. Media reports indicate that children in some work-study programs supported by local governments and schools are forced to work in factories.

 

State-sponsored forced labor continues to be an area of significant concern in China. “Reform through labor” (RTL) was a systematic form of forced labor that had existed in China for decades. The PRC government reportedly profited from this forced labor, which required many detainees to work, often with no remuneration, for up to four years. By some estimates, there had been at least 320 facilities where detained individuals worked in factories or mines, built roads, and made bricks. According to reports, several RTL facilities closed by the end of the reporting period; other RTL facilities were turned into state-sponsored drug detention or “custody and education” centers. NGOs and media report that detainees in drug detention centers are arbitrarily detained and some continued to be forced into labor. Women arrested for prostitution are detained for up to two years without due process in “custody and education” centers, and some are reportedly subjected to forced labor. These women are reportedly forced to perform manual labor—such as making tires, disposable chopsticks, or dog diapers—in “custody and education” centers throughout China.

 

Chinese women and girls are subjected to sex trafficking within China; they are typically recruited from rural areas and taken to urban centers. Well-organized criminal syndicates and local gangs play key roles in the trafficking of Chinese women and girls in China. Victims are recruited with fraudulent employment opportunities and subsequently forced into prostitution. Girls from the Tibet Autonomous Region are reportedly sent to other parts of China and subjected to forced marriage and domestic servitude.

 

While many instances of trafficking occur within China’s borders, Chinese men, women, and children are also subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking in other countries. Chinese men and women are forced to labor in service sectors, such as restaurants and shops, in overseas Chinese communities. Chinese men experience abuse at construction sites and in coal and copper mines in Africa, and face conditions indicative of forced labor, such as withholding of passports, restrictions on movement, non-payment of wages, and physical abuse. High recruitment fees, sometimes as much as the equivalent of approximately $70,000, compound Chinese migrant workers’ vulnerability to debt bondage. Chinese women and girls are subjected to forced prostitution throughout the world, including in major cities, construction sites, remote mining and logging camps, and areas with high concentrations of Chinese migrant workers. Traffickers recruit girls and young women, often from rural areas of China, using a combination of fraudulent job offers and coercion; traffickers subsequently impose large travel fees, confiscate passports, confine, or physically and financially threaten victims to compel their engagement in prostitution.

 

Women and children from neighboring Asian countries, including Burma, Vietnam, Laos, Mongolia, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), as well as from Africa, and the Americas, are subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking in China. During the year, Malagasy women and girls were recruited to work in domestic service in China; some of these women and girls were subsequently subjected to forced labor. Zimbabwean women also reported conditions indicative of labor trafficking in a hostess bar. North Korean women were subjected to forced labor in the agriculture and domestic service sectors. The Chinese government’s birth limitation policy and a cultural preference for sons create a skewed sex ratio of 117 boys to 100 girls in China, which may serve to increase the demand for prostitution and for foreign women as brides for Chinese men—both of which may be procured by force or coercion. Women and girls from Burma, Vietnam, Mongolia, Cambodia, Laos, and North Korea are recruited through marriage brokers and transported to China, where some are subsequently subjected to forced prostitution or forced labor.

 

The Government of the People’s Republic of China does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so. During the reporting period, the PRC’s National People’s Congress ratified a decision to abolish RTL. Some media and NGOs indicate that the government released detainees from and ceased operations at many RTL camps; others indicate that the government has converted some RTL facilities into different types of detention centers, including state-sponsored drug detention and “custody and education” centers, some of which employ forced labor. The government provided limited information about its investigation, prosecution, and conviction of traffickers; the government’s conflation of trafficking with other crimes made it difficult to accurately assess the government’s law enforcement efforts to prosecute trafficking offenses. Similarly, the government did not provide sufficiently detailed data to ascertain the number of victims it identified or assisted. In 2013, the government arrested a significant number of women in police raids on prostitution rings; it was unclear whether the government screened these women for indicators of trafficking, whether potential trafficking victims were referred to shelters, or whether potential victims were punished for acts committed as a direct result of being trafficking victims. Chinese authorities continued to forcibly repatriate some North Korean refugees by treating them as illegal economic migrants—despite reports that many North Korean female refugees in China are trafficking victims.

 

Recommendations for China

 

Continue to update the legal framework to further refine the definitions of trafficking-related crimes in accordance with the 2000 UN TIP Protocol, including by separating out crimes such as abduction, illegal adoption, and smuggling and criminalizing the facilitation of prostitution involving children under the age of 18; end forced labor in state-sponsored drug detention and “custody and education” centers in China; investigate, prosecute, and impose prison sentences on government officials who facilitate or are complicit in trafficking; expand efforts to institute proactive, formal procedures to systematically identify victims of trafficking—including labor trafficking victims, Chinese victims abroad, and victims among vulnerable groups, such as migrant workers and foreign and local women and children arrested for prostitution; implement procedures to prevent victims from being punished for acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked; cease detention, punishment, and forcible repatriation of trafficking victims; expand victim protection services, including comprehensive counseling, medical, reintegration, and other rehabilitative assistance for male and female victims of sex and labor trafficking; provide legal alternatives to foreign victims’ removal to countries where they would face hardship or retribution; increase the transparency of government efforts to combat trafficking and provide disaggregated data on efforts to criminally investigate and prosecute sex and labor trafficking of adults and children; and provide data on the number of criminal investigations and prosecutions of cases identified as involving forced labor, including of recruiters and employers who facilitate forced labor and debt bondage, both within China and abroad.

 

Prosecution

 

The PRC government did not provide detailed data on law enforcement efforts to combat trafficking in persons. While the Chinese criminal code prohibits many forms of trafficking and prescribes harsh penalties, the code does not appear to provide an adequate basis to prosecute all forms of trafficking. Article 240 of China’s criminal code prohibits “abducting and trafficking of women or children,” which is defined as a series of acts (e.g., abduction, kidnapping, purchasing, selling, sending, receiving) for the purpose of selling the women and children, whereas international law defines the purpose of trafficking in persons as exploitation, primarily by forced labor or forced prostitution. The Chinese law appears not to criminalize the act of subjecting women or children to forced labor by fraud or coercion or to forced prostitution unless they were also abducted, kidnapped, purchased, sold, received, or otherwise transferred for the purpose of being sold. In addition, Article 240 does not apply to men. Crimes under Article 240 are punishable by no less than ten years’ or life imprisonment and the death penalty is possible in particularly serious circumstances. Article 358 prohibits organizing prostitution and forced prostitution, which is punishable by five to 10 years’ imprisonment or, with aggravated circumstances, up to life imprisonment. Article 358 is overly broad in prohibiting both forced prostitution and prostitution. Article 359 makes it a crime to lure girls under the age of 14 into prostitution, but does not criminalize facilitating the prostitution of boys under 18 or girls between the ages of 14 and 18, although two provincial supreme courts have found Articles 358 and 359 to extend to men, women, and children, generally. Prescribed penalties under these statutes are sufficiently stringent and commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, including rape. Article 244 of the Chinese criminal code prohibits “forcing workers to labor,” punishable by three to 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine, and expands culpability to those who recruit, transport, or assist in “forcing others to labor.” Prescribed penalties under these statutes are sufficiently stringent and commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, including rape. It remains unclear whether, under Chinese law, all children under the age of 18 in prostitution are considered victims of trafficking regardless of whether force is involved.

 

In 2013, the government reported that police took law enforcement action against 5,000 alleged human trafficking organized crime groups and placed over 40,000 alleged suspects in criminal detention. Due to the government’s continued conflation of human smuggling, child abduction, and fraudulent adoptions with trafficking offenses—and its lack of judicial due process and transparency—it is impossible to ascertain from this data the number of trafficking cases the government investigated and prosecuted that were in accordance with international law. Several media reports indicated the government arrested suspects in cases involving deaf children subjected to forced begging as well as for other potential trafficking offenses. The government provided no additional information about the investigation or prosecution of these cases. The PRC government cooperated with the United States, Vietnam, Taiwan, Burma, Colombia, and Uganda on trafficking investigations, which reportedly led to the arrest and extradition of suspected traffickers and the repatriation of victims. During the reporting period, the government provided inadequate information on training for law enforcement officials, prosecutors, or judges on human trafficking issues. While PRC authorities participated in trainings with other countries and international organizations, it was unclear to what extent the Chinese government provided funding and support for these trainings. The Chinese government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of officials complicit in trafficking.

 

Protection

 

The PRC government’s efforts to protect trafficking victims remained unclear. The government did not report the number of victims it identified or assisted or the services provided to victims. The government’s lack of transparency prevents an accurate assessment of its efforts. The government reported that out of 1,400 shelters serving a wide variety of people, including victims of crime and the homeless, seven were exclusively dedicated to care for victims of human trafficking; victims reportedly also had access to basic services at China’s general-purpose shelter network. In 2013, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) established its third anti-trafficking liaison office with Burma on the countries’ border at the Nansan-Lougai port. The Lhasa Municipal Police Security Bureau reported establishing a hotline to receive information on suspected cases of trafficking and to advise victims on how to access medical and psychological services; the government did not report the number of trafficking cases investigated or victims assisted through this hotline. The Guizhou Provincial Public Security Bureau reported establishing a fund to provide monetary assistance to domestic trafficking victims and their families, but it is unclear if any victims received this benefit. The government reported operating a national hotline to receive information on suspected cases of trafficking and to refer victims to assistance providers, but it remained unclear if any trafficking victims received assistance through this referral mechanism.

 

Law enforcement and judicial officials continued to expel foreign trafficking victims. In 2013, the government arrested significant numbers of women in prostitution during police raids; some of these women were detained in “custody and education” centers and subjected to forced labor. In 2011, the Ministry of Public Security mandated all women arrested for prostitution be screened for indicators of trafficking; however, it is unclear if these women were in fact screened or, if screened, victims were referred to shelters or other care facilities. Victims of trafficking who faced hardships in their home country received vocational skills training, vocational guidance, and employment services. Chinese law provides victims the right to claim financial compensation by filing civil lawsuits and request criminal prosecution of traffickers; in an unknown number of cases, victims of trafficking were reportedly awarded monetary compensation from traffickers in 2013, in accordance with court rulings or through private settlements. It was unclear whether the government provided temporary or permanent residency visas to foreign trafficking victims as an incentive to cooperate in trafficking investigations or prosecutions.

 

Chinese authorities continued to forcibly repatriate some North Korean refugees by treating them as illegal economic migrants, despite reports that some North Korean female refugees in China are trafficking victims. The government detained and deported such refugees to North Korea, where they may face severe punishment, even death, including in North Korean forced labor camps. The Chinese government did not provide North Korean trafficking victims with legal alternatives to repatriation. The government continued to bar UNHCR access to North Koreans in northeast China; the lack of access to UNHCR assistance and forced repatriation by Chinese authorities left North Koreans vulnerable to traffickers. Chinese authorities sometimes detained and prosecuted citizens who assisted North Korean refugees and trafficking victims, as well as those who facilitated these illegal border crossings.

 

Prevention

 

The PRC government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking in persons. In November 2013, the government modified its birth limitation policy to allow families with one single-child parent to have a second child, a change that may affect future demand for prostitution and for foreign women as brides for Chinese men—both of which may be procured by force or coercion. The government implemented some steps to combat trafficking under its 2013-2020 National Action Plan. Through China’s popular social media platforms, such as Sina Weibo, the MPS used its official microblog to raise awareness of trafficking and receive information from the public regarding suspected trafficking cases. During peak traveling periods, the All-China Women’s Federation and MPS launched national anti-trafficking publicity campaigns at train and bus stations, and on national radio. These campaigns largely targeted migrant workers, a group that is particularly vulnerable to trafficking. MPS officials participated in MTV Exit’s production of a documentary on China’s human trafficking problem, which was aired on the China Central Television (CCTV) network. MPS continued to coordinate the anti-trafficking interagency process, which met semi-annually to preview progress from each ministry with regard to the national action plan and budgetary concerns. MPS made efforts to clarify responsibilities and ensure accountability between the relevant departments charged with anti-trafficking activities by training representatives from the stakeholder ministries and by allocating sufficient funds to enable each department to fulfill its role under the national action plan. The All-China Women’s Federation established new after-school programs that included a curriculum on anti-trafficking; in Yunnan province, these programs reached a significant number of students in more than 50 locations.

 

Several government policies continued to facilitate human trafficking. “Punishment clauses” within the Labor Contract Law allowed Chinese companies to impose steep fines or require substantial deposits from Chinese workers, rendering them vulnerable to forced labor. The government hukou (household registration) system continued to contribute to the vulnerability of internal migrants to trafficking. Chinese forces participating in peacekeeping initiatives abroad received anti-trafficking training from the Chinese government. The government conducted awareness-raising programs at schools to reduce the demand for commercial sex. Despite reports that Chinese nationals engaged in child sex tourism, the government made no efforts to prevent Chinese citizens from engaging in child sex tourism while abroad.